Legal Indeterminancy Made in America:  U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law by Maxeiner, James R.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 41 
Number 2 Winter 2007 pp.517-590 
Winter 2007 
Legal Indeterminancy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and 
the Rule of Law 
James R. Maxeiner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminancy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 
Val. U. L. Rev. 517 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
  517
Articles 
LEGAL INDETERMINACY MADE IN  
AMERICA:  U.S.  LEGAL METHODS AND  
THE RULE OF LAW 
James R. Maxeiner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Not every legal question has a single right answer.  In a nutshell, that 
is the problem of legal indeterminacy.1  Legal indeterminacy threatens 
the rule of law.  Professor Michael Dorf observes:  “If the application of a 
rule requires deliberation about its meaning, then the rule cannot be a 
guide to action in the way that a commitment to the rule of law appears 
to require . . . .”2  
Legal indeterminacy is a persistent problem of legal systems.  There 
is, as the German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch explained, an 
antimony among justice, public policy, and legal determinacy.  “Legal 
certainty demands positivity, yet positive law claims to be valid without 
                                                 
* © 2006, James R. Maxeiner, J.D., Cornell; LL.M., Georgetown; Ph.D. in Law, Ludwig 
Maximilian University (Munich, Germany).  Associate Professor of Law and Associate 
Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Baltimore School of 
Law.  This Article is part of a larger project on the rule of law that has been supported by 
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD), the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, and 
the University of Baltimore School of Law. It was part of a presentation titled “Legal 
Certainty through Legal Methods: Why Germany has Legal Certainty, but America has Legal 
Indeterminacy” made to the Legal Certainty Conference sponsored by the Clark Foundation 
for Legal Education held at the Glasgow Graduate School of Law, September 15-16, 2006, in 
Glasgow, Scotland. 
1 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Some Doubts on Constitutional Indeterminacy, 19 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363 (1995); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989); 
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
462 (1987); Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 340 
(1996).  Legal indeterminacy is treated either as a subset of legal uncertainty or is itself held 
to be a synonym for a larger issue of legal uncertainty.  Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: 
Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 413-14 (1996). 
2 Michael Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 877 
(2003); accord John Pickering, A Lecture on the Alleged Uncertainty of the Law, 12 AM. JURIST & 
L. MAG. 285, 287 (1834) (noting that “‘the glorious uncertainty of the law’” threatens “‘a 
government of laws and not of men’”); see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, 
Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993); Epstein, supra note 1. 
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regard to its justice or expediency [i.e., public policy].”3  It seems that 
there is no way to attain absolute legal determinacy without 
unacceptable sacrifices in justice and policy interests.  The indeterminacy 
problem is, as Dorf puts it, “built into the nature of the legal enterprise.”4  
Legal indeterminacy is a perennial issue in American law.5  In the 
first half of the twentieth century American legal realists developed it to 
challenge formalism.6  In the second half, proponents of Critical Legal 
Studies used it to attack the rule of law itself.7  In this century, Professor 
Frank Upham concluded that notwithstanding American proselytizing 
for the rule of law, the structure of the United States legal system makes 
its realization “literally impossible.”8  
Contemporary American jurisprudential writing on indeterminacy 
takes the perspective of appellate judges.9  It focuses on constitutional 
and legal theory.10  It asks:  does law bind judges?  If not, how can judges 
justify decisions based on ambiguous legal texts as law application rather 
than as law creation?11  This aspect of legal indeterminacy has long been 
                                                 
3 GUSTAV RADBRUCH, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY § 9, in 4 THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, 
RADBRUCH, AND DABIN, 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 109 (Kurt Wilk trans., 
1950).  Radbruch was also Minister of Justice in the tumultuous year 1923. 
4 Dorf, supra note 2, at 883.  “[T]he very feature of law that allows it to operate at the 
wholesale rather than the retail level—its abstraction—limits its ability to guide concrete 
decisions taken in the law’s name.”  Id. 
5 See James E. Herget, Unearthing the Origins of a Radical Idea: The Case of Legal 
Indeterminacy, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 59 (1995) (discussing nineteenth century origins). 
6 See John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, 
or How Not To Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 86-92 (1995). 
7 See generally Kress, supra note 1; Solum, supra note 1 (two articles summarizing and 
challenging their “radical indeterminacy” argument). 
8 FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY 17 (2002), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1063&prog=z
gp&proj=zdrl, reprinted in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF 
KNOWLEDGE 75 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
9 Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1667 (1991); see, e.g., 
Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 170 (1990); Dorf, supra 
note 2, at 882, 918-19; Lawson, supra note 1, at 417; Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of 
the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988); cf. Michael Taggart, Should Canadian Judges Be Legally 
Required To Give Reasoned Decisions in Civil Cases?, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1983) (noting the 
presence of “appellate-court-itis” in the United States).  The focus on appellate courts is not 
surprising in view of the background of the writers on this topic: appellate clerkships and 
doctorates in philosophy are more common than is practice experience. 
10 E.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 889-909; Epstein, supra note 1, passim. 
11 Dorf, supra note 2, at 883 (quoting Jules L. Coleman and Brian Leiter, “by legal 
indeterminacy I mean simply that in more than a trivial number of cases that come before 
the courts, ‘[l]egal norms may not sufficiently warrant any outcome’”). 
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a controversial political issue in America.12  Judicial decisions are seen as 
legitimate if they accurately apply law, but as illegitimate if they reflect 
non-legal factors.13 
Professor Dorf says contemporary theory has reached a “dead 
end.”14  Professors Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter observe:  “Only 
ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first-year law students have a 
working conception of law as determinate.”15  The American credo has 
become, says Professor Pierre Schlag:  “Law is principally what courts 
say it is.”16  Because some level of indeterminacy is inevitable, maybe 
nothing can be done to reduce indeterminacy. 
Resignation has set in.  According to Professor Schlag and his 
colleagues, “a great many leading American legal thinkers have now 
mostly abandoned ‘doing law.’”17  Unable to overcome a problem, they 
want to move on to things that they can solve.  Professor Dorf says that 
there are more important things to worry about than justifying judicial 
lawmaking as law application.18    Cope with it, America.19  “[W]e are all 
realists now.”20  But ordinary citizens have not gotten over it; 
determinacy is an important element of the rule of law.   
                                                 
12 Compare 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) 
(1804) (“[E]very prudent and cautious judge . . . . will remember, that his duty and his 
business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it.”), with The White House, 
President Announces Judge John Roberts as Supreme Court Nominee (July 19, 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050719-7.html (“He will strictly 
apply the Constitution and laws, not legislate from the bench.”). 
13 See Kress, supra note 1, at 285; cf. Dorf, supra note 2, at 880. 
14 Dorf, supra note 2, at 876-77. 
15 Coleman & Leiter, supra note 2, at 579 n.54.; cf. Gordon A. Christenson, Uncertainty in 
Law and Its Negation: Reflections, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 349 (1985); Anthony D’Amato, Legal 
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983). 
16 Pierre Schlag, A Brief Survey of Deconstruction, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 741, 741 (2005). 
17 PAUL E. CAMPOS, PIERRE SCHLAG & STEVEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE LAW 1 (1996). 
18 Dorf, supra note 2, at 979. 
19 See generally BENJAMIN GREGG, COPING IN POLITICS WITH INDETERMINATE NORMS (2003) 
(discussing coping with indeterminate norms through proceduralism and through 
pragmatism).  On the back cover of the paperback edition, Judge Richard A. Posner is 
quoted as saying: “‘Gregg demonstrates that efforts to deny or overcome normative 
indeterminacy fail.’”  Id. 
20 Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 247 (2000) (“The 
slogan ‘we are all realists now’ is so well-accepted in North America (in particular in the 
United States) that an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is that judicial 
explanations of a judgment tell us little if anything about why a case was decided as it 
was.”); see also Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting 
the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 399-400 (1999) (noting 
much the same for the public at large). 
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The thesis of this Article is that the indeterminacy that plagues 
American law is “Made in America.”  It is not inherent in law.  Rather, it 
is a product of specific choices of legal methods and of legal structures 
made in the American legal system.   
American legal methods and structures have not mastered the 
transition from the world of the eighteenth century to that of the twenty-
first.  Some legal methods are stuck in the nineteenth century.  Others 
have put nineteenth-century methods behind them, only to adopt 
methods even less satisfactory from the standpoint of legal determinacy.     
The contemporary discussion of legal theory accepts legal 
indeterminacy as an inalterable fact.21  It has missed an opportunity to 
inform practice of alternatives that would enhance determinacy.  
Practice—unaware of alternatives—is resigned to the present 
unsatisfactory state.   
The theoretical discussion pays practice no mind.  The focus on 
whether legal rules control lawmaking by appellate judges addresses an 
important question, but is distant from how legal indeterminacy impacts 
practice.22  That much could be done to enhance determinacy becomes 
apparent when one takes into account the perspective of those who are 
subject to the law.   
Part II sets out the approach of this Article and explains how the 
concept of the rule of law requires that rules guide those subject to them. 
It discusses the relationships among the rule of law, legal methods, and 
indeterminacy.  Parts III, IV, and V survey indeterminacy in methods of 
lawmaking, law-finding, and law-applying, respectively.  Part VI shows 
how rule conflicts result from deficient coordination among lawmakers.  
Finally, Part VII recommends looking at the legal methods of other legal 
systems.   
Through its examination of legal indeterminacy and legal methods, 
this Article seeks to raise awareness of legal methods generally.  It 
discusses the variety of legal methods that are available.  Specifically, 
this Article suggests that the choice of methods has profound effects 
throughout the legal system.23  Through breadth of coverage it seeks to 
                                                 
21 E.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 877. 
22 See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
23 See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY & METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW, 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1986) (providing an example of such work limited to one area of 
law); James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “Methods Awareness” (Methodenbewußtsein) for German Jurists, 
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show how pervasive self-inflicted indeterminacy is in order to show the 
need for fundamental change.   
To achieve breadth within the compass of one article, compromises 
are necessary.  This Article does not measure levels of indeterminacy or 
even speculate whether such measurement is possible.  It does not 
undertake to establish that the American legal system is highly 
indeterminate or even that it is more indeterminate than other legal 
systems.  It does not purport to discuss all sources of legal indeterminacy 
or even all that are peculiar to the United States. It does implicitly accept 
that indeterminacy in the American legal system is substantial and is 
greater than need be. But it does not evaluate whether the costs that 
indeterminacy imposes are outweighed by countervailing benefits.  
Finally, this Article accepts certain fundamental assumptions of the rule 
of law as desirable, as Part II more fully details.  
II.  THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL METHODS 
The rule of law promises legal determinacy.  In popular use, the term 
often incorporates ideals of a liberal and democratic state, such as 
democracy, constitutionalism, human rights, and a free-market economy.  
As such, it is a contested concept that means different things to different 
people.24  This Article uses the rule of law in a formal and narrow sense.  
Used in this manner, the rule of law focuses on principles that direct and 
limit the making and application of substantive law.25  
In a formal sense the rule of law is a law of rules.26  When the rule of 
law is confined to a formal sense, it is a less contested concept.  
                                                                                                             
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER ZUM 70.  GEBURTSTAG 114 (Berhard Großfeld et 
al., eds., 1998). 
24 Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, JURISTENZEITUNG, 1984, at 65-66 
[hereinafter MacCormick, Der Rechstsstaat]; Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, An 
Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1 
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Varieties] (both using exactly the 
same words, “an essentially contested concept”); see also RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF 
LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2001). 
25 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91-113 
(2004) (discussing both the substantive and formal theories of the Rule of Law).  The 
advantages of a formal theory are discussed in Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of Law, 
6 RATIO JURIS 127, 136-38 (1993) [hereinafter Summers, A Formal Theory of Law]. 
26 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 96; Frederick Schauer, Rules, the Rule of Law, and 
the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT 69 (1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Rules]; Summers, A 
Formal Theory of Law, supra note 25, at 131. 
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Specifically, the rule of law in a formal sense requires that laws be:27  
validly made and publicly promulgated, of general application, stable, 
clear in meaning and consistent, and ordinarily prospective.28  In this 
sense, it imposes requirements on the application of law:29  law 
application should be impartial, provide parties who are sanctioned an 
opportunity to be heard, and deliver predictable, consistent decisions in 
individual cases.30  
Rules and the requirements of the formal rule of law help law fulfill 
an ordering function.  They make voluntary compliance with law 
possible.  They mean that law can guide those subject to it.  They protect 
persons subject to law from arbitrary use of the power to make and 
apply law.  When the rule of law is safeguarded, subjects can rely on the 
law and can foresee application of state power.31 As important as these 
requirements are, they only assure the integrity and the regularity of the 
application of the legal rules; they do not assure that these rules serve 
either justice or public policy.32 
A. Causes of Legal Indeterminacy 
Causes of legal indeterminacy include:  indefinite rules, conflict of 
rules, lack of rules, and uncertain application of rules.33  One thinks first 
of indefinite rules, but conflicting rules also produce indeterminacy.  
While a lack of rules in today’s regulated world is uncommon, rules 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat, supra note 24, at 67; Randall Peerenboom, A 
Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law and Administrative Law Reform in the PRC, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. CHINA 45, 51 (2003). 
28 These requirements are found in: LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 
1969) [hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY]; D. NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 
45 (1999); David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 317 (2003) 
(referring to a “minimalist rule of law”); MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat, supra note 24, at 68; 
Peerenboom, Varieties, supra note 24, at 3 (contrasting a “thick” rule of law with this “thin” 
one); Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 
1693-95 (1999) [hereinafter Summers, Principles]. 
29 FULLER, MORALITY, supra note 28, at 81-91 (who called this “[c]ongruence”). 
30 See Summers, Principles, supra note 28, at 1693-95 (detailing a comprehensive 
inventory of the requirements of a formal rule of law). 
31 See Peerenboom, Varieties, supra note 24, at 3; Summers, Principles, supra note 28, at 
1705 (citing Rudolf von Ihering for the proposition that “having the law in the form of clear 
and definite rules is, itself, a bulwark against official interference with individual 
freedom”). 
32 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1314 (2001) (noting that “it is entirely compatible with legal regimes 
predicated on slavery [or] apartheid”). 
33 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION 1 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick 
trans., 1989).  This list is suggestive; no claim is made that it is either comprehensive or 
systematic. 
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often intentionally grant those charged with applying them the authority 
to make value judgments.  In such cases, rules provide only general 
limits, but no single correct answer.34  Application of a rule may also be 
uncertain because the authority charged with applying the law may be 
authorized to decide contrary to the rule, or may improperly apply or 
fail to apply the rule, either out of corruption or incompetence, or may 
reach the wrong conclusion because of incorrect fact-finding.  
By focusing on whether rules require appellate judges to reach 
particular correct answers, the American discussion of legal 
indeterminacy tends to overstate the level of indeterminacy and to 
overlook opportunities for decreasing it.  Perfect precision is not 
essential for substantial fulfillment of the guidance function of the rule of 
law.  This is apparent when the perspective is that of subjects, rather 
than of law-appliers. 
B. The Perspective of People Subject to Rules 
Whether law binds appellate judges is only one aspect of legal 
indeterminacy.  Another aspect is whether and how well law guides 
people in complying with law.35  The guidance function is not unknown 
in the United States, but it is as likely to be observed by legal 
philosophers from foreign countries as by natives.  Hans Kelsen 
commented that “individuals who have to obey the law by behaving in a 
way that avoids sanctions, must understand the legal norms and 
therefore must ascertain their meaning.”36  H.L.A. Hart wrote of the need 
for “certain rules” that people can apply to themselves.37 
Such self-application of law is essential to a well-functioning state 
based on the rule of law.  If rules fail to guide citizens, citizens cannot 
apply law to themselves.  The social order breaks down.38  For every 
                                                 
34 See HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY §§ 34-35, 78-79 
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley Paulson trans., 1992).  This is a translation of the 
first edition of the PURE THEORY OF LAW (REINE RECHTSLEHRE, 1934; the second edition was 
published in 1960). 
35 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 349. 
36 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW § 45, at 348 (Max Knight, transl., 2d ed.  1967). 
37 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, CONCEPT]; see 
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL STUDY 379 (2006) 
(using the term “self-application”). 
38 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).  “Perhaps no characteristic of an 
organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a 
system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to 
govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable 
manner.”  Id. 
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instance of judicial application of legal rules, there are millions of 
instances of individuals applying rules to themselves.  Most people pass 
through their entire lives without ever being party to a judicial decision 
of any kind, but no one of age lives even a single day without applying a 
rule to himself or herself. 
Today American jurists speak of legal indeterminacy; in the 
nineteenth century they spoke of legal uncertainty.39  The change is not 
coincidental.  Today they are concerned with whether ambiguous legal 
texts determine decisions of appellate judges; in the nineteenth century 
Americans worried whether legal texts “made plain to the apprehension 
of the people what conduct on their part is forbidden.”40  The perspective 
has shifted from that of ordinary people seeking to abide by the law, to 
that of appellate judges making decisions.   
This Article uses the older perspective of those subject to rules to 
avoid conflating the legal system with appellate decision-making.41  
Ordinary people expect to abide by the law without ever being the 
subject of judicial decisions.  They have practical concerns; they want to 
know just enough law to be able to abide by it.  They want to know what 
to expect from the legal system as much as whether at the end of a long 
process, a more or less determinate legal rule may or may not constrain 
this or that appellate judge.42  Law-abiding people apply legal rules to 
themselves.  Law directs them in their conduct; they need not be 
compelled by others to follow the rules.43  Everyday they engage in 
                                                 
39 Herget, supra note 5.  One also spoke of the “glorious uncertainty” of the law.  See 
Pickering, supra note 2, at 287. 
40 Thomas M. Cooley, The Uncertainty of the Law, 22 AM. L. REV. 347, 355 (1888).  Cooley 
was a noted judge, scholar, president of the American Bar Association from 1893 to 1894, 
and first Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission.  JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS, 
AMERICAN BAR LEADERS, BIOGRAPHIES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 1878-1928, at 77 (1932). 
41 Cf. Dorf supra note 2, at 881 (stating that “much of the contemporary debate focuses on 
how some single decisionmaker goes about the solitary task of resolving ambiguity”). 
42 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1994); Sanford Levinson, On Positivism 
and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. 
REV. 843, 845 (1993). 
43 This Article is not concerned with why some people are law-abiding or with when 
people are morally justified in not following rules.  See Heidi A. Hurd, Rationality of Rule-
Following: Why You Should Be a Law-Abiding Anarchist (Except When You Shouldn’t), 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 75 (2005) (articulating a highly readable statement of why one should follow 
rules and yet distrust them). 
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countless acts of self-application of law.44  To abide by the law, they must 
know what the law requires.   
The rule of law makes law-abiding possible.  It requires that rules of 
law be clear and consistent and that their application be sure and 
predictable.  When that is true, law-abiding people can know what the 
law is and can orient their conduct on what it requires. 
C. Indeterminacy and Self-Application 
Indeterminacy endangers self-application of law.  When law is clear 
and its application sure, self-application is likely to match rules rather 
closely.  When law is less clear or its application less sure, the calculus 
changes.  Some people subject to rules are compulsive rule-followers:  
they follow the rules no matter what the rules are, so long as they can 
know them and consider them reasonably legitimate.  On the other hand, 
many people subject to rules are not so law-abiding.  If law is 
indeterminate, they start to calculate.  They weigh competing 
considerations.  Even with clear rules they may consider, what is the 
likelihood that the rule will be enforced?  What is the benefit to me if I 
fail to comply?45  Thus on the highways, virtually everyone drives on the 
nationally-mandated side of the road, but almost all drivers sometimes 
fail to observe posted speed limits when they find it in their interest and 
believe they can do so without unacceptable risk.46  When rules and their 
application are less clear, the complexity of this calculation increases.  
Now parties subject to rules must also discern how those rules are put 
into practice.  Those less inclined toward law-abiding may play close or 
even over the line.  Those more inclined toward law-abiding or less able 
to tolerate risk may be timid.  Although little discussed in theory, this is 
a known issue of everyday practice.  For many clients, vindication under 
a rule is of little solace if the costs or risks of vindication are prohibitive.   
                                                 
44 Cf. HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 130, 135. 
45 See generally Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions, Address 
Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITING 1832-1858, at 28, 31 (Library of America ed., 1974).  
Lincoln observed the pernicious effect on self-application of permitting violations of law.  
Id.; see infra note 186. 
46 Moorfield Storey, Lawlessness, Address Delivered Before the Maryland State Bar 
Association, 13 AM. LAW. 290, 291 (1905).  “Ask any friend who owns one of these cars, and 
you will learn his opinion of the law, and how determined he is to decide for himself when 
to obey it.”  Id.  Storey was editor of the American Law Review from 1873 to 1879, and 
president of the American Bar Association from 1895 to 1896.  ROGERS, supra note 40, at 86. 
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D. Legal Methods Between Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law 
Almost every advanced legal system pays at least lip service to 
requirements of the rule of law at a high level of generality.  But how 
does one determine whether a legal system delivers on its promise?  One 
approach is to consider how it implements the rule of law.47  Legal 
methods are the principal means by which law content is made clear and 
by which law application is made predictable.48  
In a broad sense, legal methods are devices used to apply abstract 
legal rules to factual situations in order to decide concrete cases.49  Legal 
methods as the means to decide concrete cases include, in a broad sense, 
creating as well as implementing legal rules.50  This Article considers 
these methods under three rubrics:  lawmaking, law-finding, and law-
applying.51  The classification is for convenience.  Some legal methods 
classified under one rubric might just as well be classified under a 
different one.   
Lawmaking is legislative.  The legislature adopts a statute and an 
administrative authority adopts a regulation that implements the statute.  
Law-finding52 is determination by a decision-maker of the applicable rule 
of law for a particular case and any necessary interpretation of the rule.  
Law-applying is application of found rules to decide particular cases.  
Most commonly this process presupposes a process for fact-finding as 
well as law-finding.53  The facts found are then related to applicable law.  
                                                 
47 Summers, Principles, supra note 28, at 1691 n.2. 
48 Discussions of legal methods qua legal methods often focus on handling precedents 
and construing statutes.  See, e.g., INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. 
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); INTERPRETING STATUTES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). 
49 1 WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER 
DARSTELLUNG  13-15 (1975). 
50 Cf. JAN SCHAPP, HAUPTPROBLEME DER JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE (1983) (relating 
statute, case, and judicial decision). 
51 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 61.  Hart referred to a similar threefold classification: 
“law-making, law-identifying, and law-applying.”  Id.  Professor Cappalli refers to 
creating, elaborating, and applying substantive law.  Richard B. Cappalli, The Disappearance 
of Legal Method, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 398 (1997). 
52 While the term law-finding is infrequently used in the United States, it is not 
unknown.  See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, Law Making and Law Finding, in LAW FINDING THROUGH 
EXPERIENCE AND REASON: THREE LECTURES 1 (1960); Roscoe Pound, Making Law and Finding 
Law, 82 CENT. L.J. 351 (1916).  The term is also used in England.  See, e.g., LAW MAKING, 
LAW FINDING, AND LAW SHAPING. THE DIVERSE INFLUENCES (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1997). 
53 The process of fact-finding also contributes to indeterminacy.  It is, however, beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
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Rule conflicts result not only where lawmaking is deficient, but also 
where multiple lawmakers fail to coordinate with each other.   
American legal methods as implemented by American structures of 
authority do not well fulfill the guidance function of the rule of law.  
Originally conceptualized in a largely agrarian and isolated world, in the 
nineteenth century these methods and structures proved inadequate to 
meet the demands of a modern, industrial society.  While efforts were 
undertaken to modernize legal methods, success has been limited.  The 
barriers to determinacy that the American system faces now, it faced 
long ago and failed to deal with adequately. 
The balance of this Article shows many instances in which American 
legal methods fail the guidance function of the rule of law by increasing 
indeterminacy when they might have promoted determinacy instead.  
III.  LAWMAKING 
The rule of law is a law of rules.  In a literate society, people subject 
to rules expect that rules are written and that everyone can read them.54  
They expect rules that are reasonably definite and that do not conflict 
with other rules.  Written rules take the form of statutes adopted by 
legislatures; lawmaking is central to realization of the rule of law. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, unwritten common law 
provided most of the rules under which Americans lived.55  These rules 
developed out of the decisions of judges of individual cases apart from 
statutes.  To the uninitiated, the very idea of rules that are not written is 
odd if not threatening.  Even friends of the common law acknowledge 
that common law rules cannot hope to have the certainty and precision 
of written rules.   
In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, statutes 
displaced common law as the principal source of American law.56  Today 
Americans live in “the Age of Statutes.”57  Statutes displaced common 
law for good reasons.  Statutes legitimize political decisions.  They 
                                                 
54 Cf. Andrew Beckerman-Rodeau, A Jurisprudential Approach to Common Law Legal 
Analysis, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 271 (1999). 
55 TIMOTHY WALKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK 
FOR LAW STUDENTS 53 (1837). 
56 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (referring to 
the “statutorification” of American law); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (2000). 
57 CALABRESI, supra note 56, at 1. 
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provide predictability and impose uniformity.  They can facilitate their 
own application by drawing bright lines and requiring use of forms.  
They speak directly to people subject to law by giving information about 
what is expected.58  All these can do better than common law, which 
cannot do some of these things at all.  Nineteenth-century critics, who 
saw in the uncertainty of the common law a “vast evil” and preferred 
written law,59 should have cause for celebration in this displacement.  
But the promise of the written law has to a significant degree been 
denied to Americans.  American statutes do not always provide a high 
level of guidance. 
American jurists are uncomfortable with statutes.60 The United 
States, says Judge Richard A. Posner, has no “overall theory of 
legislation.”61  An overall theory of legislation requires methods of 
drafting and methods of statutory interpretation.  While the American 
legal system has methods of statutory interpretation, these are, according 
to Justice Antonin Scalia, unintelligible.62  It has no method of legislative 
drafting, which it has long neglected.63  While scholarly interest in 
statutes has recently increased dramatically, the new literature of 
statutes is largely limited to political process and statutory 
interpretation.64  It pays little attention to how legislatures should write 
rules.65  Consequently, the American legal system pays a high price in 
indeterminacy for its lack of effective methods of statutory drafting and 
interpretation. 
                                                 
58 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 125-26. 
59 E.g., WALKER, supra note 55, at 56.  Walker’s description of the common law as a “vast 
evil” is omitted from posthumous editions, including the 9th edition, revised by Clement 
Bates in 1887, and the 11th edition, revised by Clement Bates in 1905. 
60 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 56, at 3. 
61 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 800 (1983). 
62 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION]. 
63 Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 96. 
64 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 829 (1988); ESKRIDGE ET AL., 
supra note 56; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION. POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1993); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and 
Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
65 Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1282, 1284 (1994).  “[M]ost legal scholarship still focuses on the judge’s art, rather than 
the legislative drafter’s art.”  Id. 
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In calculating the costs for determinacy of lack of effective methods 
of legislative drafting, one is inclined to think first of the obvious costs of 
poorly drafted rules.  Effective methods can provide rules that are clear, 
or at least no more indefinite than necessary.  They can prescribe 
particular elements for norms that set out precisely what is required.66  
When rules are insufficiently definite, people who obey rules may 
circumscribe their conduct too much, while people who flout rules may 
constrain their conduct too little.   
Effective methods of legislative drafting provide tools to enable legal 
systems to deal with uncertainty in law and society.  These tools include 
general clauses that are deliberately vague to permit their development 
by those charged with applying them, exceptions to otherwise generally 
applicable rules, and authorizations to officials charged with rules 
exceptionally to depart from them.  Effective methods of legislative 
drafting allow legal systems to grant discretion to officials and to 
provide for control of that discretion.67  
Additionally, effective methods of legislative drafting contribute to 
coherence and consistency of all rules overall.  A statute should, of 
course, not conflict with itself.  But statutes should not only be internally 
consistent, they should be harmonious in their operation with other rules 
to which those subject to them are also subject.68  Part VI discusses the 
frequent rule conflicts that result in the American legal system from the 
failures of multiple lawmakers to coordinate their legislation adequately 
(i.e., to make their rules consistent).  But disappointingly, even single 
American lawmakers frequently fail to make rules consistent and 
systematic.  The inconsistent Florida election statutes that precipitated 
the constitutional crisis of the 2000 election are only the most notorious 
instance in recent times of failed legislation.69  Less dramatic are the costs 
                                                 
66 See HANS SCHNEIDER, GESETZGEBUNG: EIN LEHR- UND HANDBUCH §§ 3-4 (3d ed. 2004). 
67 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 219-28 
(1969) (arguing for greater use of rules to structure and check administrative discretion); 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 11 (Kenneth Culp Davis ed., 1971) 
(containing national reports on limiting and controlling discretion); MORTIMER R. KADISH & 
SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM 
LEGAL RULES (1973) (arguing that officials’ roles implicitly justify their failure to follow 
rules, which argument thus sub silentio acknowledges that existing law does not well grant 
and control discretion). 
68 Ernst Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 ILL. L. REV. 264, 268 (1918). 
69 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1231-34 (Fla. 2000), 
rev’d sub nom., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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of poorly systematized rules for everyday law application and 
enforcement.70 
A. Defeat of Codification 
A remarkable feature of American legal history is that statutes 
displaced common law without effective methods of legislative drafting 
and statutory interpretation developing.  Any explanation of this 
development should take into consideration the defeat of codification 
and the extension of common law methods to statutes.  There was a time 
when the American legal system did consider effective methods of 
dealing with statutes. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the American legal community 
debated adoption of systematic legislation in the form of codes.  Codes 
would furnish state law with certainty and coordinate specific laws with 
one another.71  David Dudley Field, the preeminent proponent of 
codification, saw written rules as essential for predictability in law.72  He 
saw law as a system of rules.73 
But America did not learn how to legislate effectively; the organized 
bar defeated codification.  Field’s great opponent, James Coolidge 
Carter,74 argued that certainty in the written law came only by sacrificing 
justice through unwritten law.75  Unlike common law rules, Carter 
argued, statutory rules “are rigid and absolute, and cannot be modified 
and shaped to suit the varying aspects which different cases may 
exhibit.”76  Carter’s arguments found a wide acceptance in the American 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 45, 49 (1998).  A former Deputy Associate Attorney General describes the federal 
criminal laws as a “morass of statutory provisions and judicial decisions [that] is so 
complex, and so confusing to law enforcement officials as well as to the public, that it could 
scarcely have been designed to be less efficient.  This is extraordinarily costly.”  Id. 
71 See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 225 (1917) (referring to the 
latter as “correlation”). 
72 Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an 
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 340 (1988). 
73 See, e.g., David Dudley Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science, in 1 SPEECHES, 
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 517, 530 (A.P. Sprague 
ed., 1884).  “The existence of a system of rules and conformity to them are the essential 
conditions of all free government, and of republican government above all others.”  Id. 
74 Carter was president of the American Bar Association from 1894 to 1895.  ROGERS, 
supra note 40, at 80. 
75 JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW (1884), 
excerpted in THE LIFE OF THE LAW, READINGS ON THE GROWTH OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 115, 
118 (John Honold ed., 1964). 
76 Id. at 120. 
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legal community, which persists to this day.77  The argument against 
codification claims that judicial legislation is able to adapt law to 
changing social reality gradually and without the shock of sudden 
legislative change.78 
Carter both understated the flexibility of statutory methods and 
overstated the determinacy of American common law methods.  If that 
was not then apparent, after more than a century, it is now crystal clear 
to anyone familiar with the rampant indeterminacy of American 
treatment of statutes and the relative flexibility of civil law statutes. 
Already a half-century before Carter, Justice Story refuted the 
argument that common law development is uniquely suited to 
adaptation over time.79  Claims of superior adaptability of common law 
over statute collapse when brought down to specific changes in laws, 
where it often turns out that a statutory solution proved more effective.80 
While in hindsight Carter’s arguments appear flawed, opponents of 
codification succeeded not only in defeating the codes, but also in 
retarding development of effective methods of lawmaking in the United 
States.  
                                                 
77 Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil 
Law, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 87, 99 (1998) (speaking of “adaptability”). 
78 William Draper Lewis, Present Status of the American Law Institute: The Common Law 
and the Common Law System of Administering and Developing Law, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (1929). 
79 Joseph Story, Law, Legislation, Codes, in 7 ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA 576, 588 (Francis 
Lieber ed. & trans., 1831), reprinted as Appendix III, in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 350, 367 (1971) [hereinafter Story, Law]. 
To say that, if found inconvenient, it [the common law] may be altered, 
so as to suit the future interests of the particular state, is, in effect, no 
argument at all; for the same may be said as to any provision of a 
systematic code.  No code is supposed to be unalterable. 
Id. 
80 Superiority of common law judicial legislation is claimed, for example, in 
displacement of the common law rule of contributory negligence by comparative fault.  See, 
e.g., M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 555, 595-98 (1996).  Yet civil law jurisdictions had comparative fault, when 
common law jurisdictions did not and some American states still have contributory 
negligence.  See Jennifer J. Karangelen, Comment, The Road to Judicial Abolishment of 
Contributory Negligence Has Been Paved by Bozman v. Bozman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 265 (2004). 
Even in the field of constitutional law, which is uniquely oriented toward judicial 
legislation, statutes can be more effective.  Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and 
Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 
397, 440 (1999).  “Desegregation gained its major legal impetus not from Brown [v. Board of 
Education], but from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. Particularist and Unprofessional Drafting 
The rule of law requires that rules be generally applicable and that 
they operate within a harmonious system.  American legislation, instead 
of looking like systematic rules for the population at large, is sometimes 
just another way of resolving private disputes or of achieving private 
goals.81  In the American legal system, private interests and amateur 
draftsmen often determine and draft the laws that legislatures adopt.  
The periodic lobbying scandals that afflict the United States should be no 
surprise, as the system permits individual legislators to control 
particular provisions of legislation.  Reform attempts fail because instead 
of curtailing the power of individual legislators, they merely punish the 
misuse of that power.   
Already in the nineteenth century, other western democracies 
institutionalized the process of legislating in order to improve the quality 
of statutes and further their coordination.82  A common approach today, 
by practice or by law, requires that legislation originate with the 
government, a government ministry, or a parliamentary faction, and not 
with individual legislators.  Proposed legislation is drafted, not by 
legislators, but by professional draftsmen.  One or more government 
ministries, often the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for reviewing 
legislation prepared by other ministries and coordinating it with the 
constitution and other laws.  For some ministries this is a principal 
reason for their existence.  These measures seek to raise the quality and 
generality of legislation by shutting out private interests and entrusting 
drafting to those better able to promote the public interest, to coordinate 
new legislation with old, and to increase the transparency of the 
motivation behind the legislation.  American-style lobbyist drafting is 
rare or unknown in Europe.83 
When in the nineteenth century Britain adopted the institution of the 
professional parliamentary draftsman and the practice of government-
originated legislation, American jurists took note and urged comparable 
practices here.84  In the early twentieth century, jurists—no less 
                                                 
81 Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 243 (1998) 
(pointing out the similarity between American legislation and common law adjudication). 
82 ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 225 (1917).  Ernst Freund 
called this coordination, “correlation of provisions.”  Id. 
83 See, e.g., Rebecca Goldsmith, In Europe, Lobbying Is a Dirty Word, NEWHOUSE NEWS 
SERV., Mar. 16, 2004. 
84 See, e.g., Simon Stern, The English Methods of Legislation Compared with the American, 
PENN MONTHLY, May 1879, at 336, 357 (discussing Continental and English practices, 
comparing these critically with the practice in the United States, and noting that “It is true, 
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illustrious than Roscoe Pound and Benjamin N. Cardozo—observed the 
benefits for legislation of European-style ministries of justice.85  The 
salutary effect of their efforts to improve legislation can be seen in the 
creation of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws in 1893, in the founding of the American Law Institute in 1923, 
both of which are discussed in Part V below, in the establishment in 
many states of law revision commissions,86 and in the creation of offices 
of legislative counsel in both houses of Congress.87  Without doubt, 
individual pieces of American legislation are technically better, thanks to 
the work of these institutions.  Yet their successes have been spotty 
rather than pervasive, largely because their involvement is sporadic 
rather than systematic.  The National Conference, the American Law 
Institute, and law revision commissions all work on a specific project 
basis.  Even the Congressional offices of legislative counsel, which could 
work systematically, are not so engaged by Congress, but act only when 
called upon.  There is no obligation for Congress to make use of their 
services.88  Lacking from all of these institutions is a combination in one 
body of subject-matter expertise, professional drafting skills, political 
                                                                                                             
we have written Constitutions; but it is nobody’s business to see to it, before a public bill is 
passed, that the bill is in conformity therewith . . . .”); Francis Wayland, Opening Address 
on Certain Defects in Our Methods of Making Laws Before the American Social Science 
Association at Its Annual Meeting, Saratoga Springs 13, 21, 27 (Sept. 5, 1881) (noting the 
practices of the English House of Commons, the new institution of the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office and that similar approaches were in place in France, Prussia, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Italy, and other Continental nations where they worked to “secure the 
uniformity, coherence, clearness and accuracy which are so essential to the efficient 
operation of all legislative enactments”).  There is an extended report of Wayland’s address 
in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1881, at 5. 
85 ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 736-37 (1959); Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of 
Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921) (citing two contemporary works by Roscoe Pound); 
see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 14-15 (6th 
ed. 1998). 
86 See, e.g., California Law Revision Comm’n, GOVERNMENT CODE § 8289(a), 
www.clrc.ca.gov/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); Connecticut Law Revision Comm’n, 
www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); Michigan Law Revision Comm’n, 
www.council.legislature.mi.gov/mlrc.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006); New Jersey Law 
Revision Comm’n, www.lawrev.state.nj.us/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); New York Law 
Revision Comm’n, www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).  The federal 
Office of the Law Revision Counsel is charged with publishing the United States Code and 
is not analogous to the state commissions. See uscode.house.gov/ (last visited Sept. 11, 
2006). 
87 Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, 
http://legcoun.house.gov/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); Office of the Legislative Counsel, 
U.S. Senate, http://slc.senate.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). 
88 See generally Peter M. Goodloe, Simplification—A Federal Legislative Perspective, 105 
DICK. L. REV. 247 (2001). 
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influence on legislation, and political responsibility to people subject to 
legislation.   
Consequently, the picture of American legislative drafting is varied.  
Some federal statutes and some state statutes, particularly uniform laws, 
receive close attention for clarity and consistency of content.  But many 
do not.89  Legislative language often results, not from careful study, but 
from compromises and late-night drafting or is provided by third 
parties.90 Statutory drafting is not a carefully controlled process.91  
Of course creating clear and authoritative rules is only the first step 
toward applying rules to concrete cases and giving subjects guidance in 
law.  
IV.  LAW-FINDING 
The existence of rules alone is not enough to realize the rule of law.  
Decision of concrete cases requires law-finding (i.e., locating applicable 
rules and determining what those rules mean).  Law-finding has two 
sides:  identification of rules and their interpretation.  In well-functioning 
legal systems in ordinary cases, law-finding is nearly invisible and does 
not give rise to indeterminacy.  But in the American system, even in 
pedestrian cases, law-finding often is highly visible and productive of 
substantial indeterminacy.  The process of law-finding sometimes 
undermines, rather than supports, law as rules.  It fails to find a rule or 
changes the rule in the course of application.  As a result it creates 
substantial indeterminacy for those subject to rules and makes self-
application of law difficult.   
A. Law-finding as Lawmaking 
The common law is identified with case law—that is, with judge-
made law created through decisions of cases.  Yet most modern legal 
systems, to some extent, acknowledge some form of judge-made law.92  
Judges are under a duty to decide controversies before them and must 
decide cases even if they can find no rule to apply.93  When they decide 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 81, at 231.  “We may sometimes succeed in enacting 
carefully prepared legislation, but that is a rarity.”  Id. 
90 See generally Goodloe, supra note 88. 
91 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Honoring David Shapiro: Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1922 (2004). 
92 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS 39-40 (1987). 
93 See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty 
To Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 180-81 (2005) (distinguishing weak and strong requirements). 
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cases in the absence of clearly applicable rules, they may overtly create 
new rules to guide decision or they may through their decisions suggest 
a practice that future judges will follow.  While they may prefer to 
emphasize the latter rather than the former role, in either case, the effect 
is that judges in some sense make law.94 
Lawmaking incident to law-finding is controversial.  On the one 
hand, it threatens basic elements of the rule of law (e.g., that law is 
knowable beforehand and that neutral and uninvolved judges apply that 
law to individual cases).  It raises the question of whether the judiciary is 
usurping the legislative function.95 On the other hand, if there is no 
lawmaking incident to law-finding, many a party will be denied justice.  
Historically different legal systems have dealt with lawmaking incident 
to law-finding differently.  The Prussian General Law of 1794 went so far 
as to prohibit statutory interpretation altogether, not to speak of judicial 
lawmaking.96 But today, most legal systems accept some form of 
lawmaking incident to law-finding.  None does so with greater 
eloquence than the Swiss, which explicitly authorizes judges to decide 
unprovided for cases as if they were legislators.97  
Lawmaking incident to law-finding thus is not unique to the United 
States or to common law legal systems.  Precedents both here and abroad 
are thought to promote determinacy.  Yet case law, as it has developed in 
the United States in the last two centuries, often contributes to 
indeterminacy. 
                                                                                                             
Article 4 of the French Civil Code states such a duty absolutely: “A judge who refuses to 
give judgment on the pretext of legislation being silent, obscure or insufficient, may be 
prosecuted for being guilty of a denial of justice.”  C. CIV. art. 4 (Goerges Rouhette, trans.), 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm. 
94 John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1052, 
1056 (1931). 
95 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW 2 (1997) (arguing 
that the courts have developed law “with a vengeance, and that in so doing they have 
largely emasculated the rule of law in this country”); Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its 
Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 172 (1891) 
(“The phrase ‘judicial legislation’ carries on its face the notion of judicial-usurpation.”). 
96 ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, Einleitung §§ 46, 
47, at 58 (Hans Hattenhauer ed., 2d ed. 1994).  This was not as strange then as it might seem 
today.  Napoleon, himself a contemporary of the drafters of the Prussian law, prohibited 
writing of commentaries on his new code. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 92, at 156. 
97 Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch of Dec. 10, 1907, as revised Dec. 27, 2005 [ZGB] [Civil 
Code] Art. 1(2), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/2/210.de.pdf (visited Nov. 11, 
2006). 
Maxeiner: Legal Indeterminancy Made in America:  U.S. Legal Methods and the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
536 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
B. Finding Common Law Rules 
In common law systems, ideas of the nature of case law and of the 
role of judges in creating it have varied.  In the eighteenth century under 
what is referred to as the “declaratory theory,” judges asserted that they 
never created law, but only declared law that had always existed.  
Binding to precedent did not figure prominently in that theory.98  The 
classic theory of binding to precedent—of stare decisis—developed 
largely in the nineteenth century.  Under the classic theory, precedents 
appear as another form of positive law where judges substitute for 
legislators as the givers of rules.  Under that theory, precedents had 
binding authority comparable to legislative statutes.  Modern American 
theories of stare decisis reduce the binding effect of precedents; some 
almost deny that generally applicable rules result from common law 
adjudication at all. 
Outwardly judges’ methods of finding applicable common law rules 
have been the same under all variations of common law theory.  First, 
look for a directly applicable rule in the form of a precedent on “all 
fours.”  Then, if there is no such rule, take as a starting point the ratio 
decidendi of a precedent, the reason for deciding a previous case,99 and 
consider whether there is another rule, of which the earlier precedent is 
an example, which would encompass the later dispute as well.  
Theoretically judges move analogically to extend the earlier ratio to cover 
the facts of the new controversy.100  While this procedure is outwardly 
the same under all theories, the attention paid to prior precedents and in 
particular to the ratio decidendi, varies depending upon how strictly 
judges have felt themselves bound by these precedents.  In England 
where binding to precedent has been stricter than in the United States, 
more energy has been devoted to distinguishing the ratio decidendi than 
in the United States where there is greater willingness to permit judges 
to launch off on their own.  Where binding is less strict, precedents 
                                                 
98 Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 774-76 (2004) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Failure]; Thayer, supra note 95, at 180. 
99 KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 45-47 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter 
LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH]; Arthur L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. 
REV. 117 (1959). 
100 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2, 8-9 (1949); see 
LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 99, at 49, and already 150 years ago, George van 
Santvoord, The Study of the Law as a Science: An Address to the Graduating Class of the 
Law School of the University of Albany 35 (Nov. 21, 1856) [hereinafter Van Santvoord, 
Study of Law] (“legal precedents ought not despotically to govern, but discretely to guide 
us”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/1
2006] Legal Indeterminacy Made in America 537 
provide more rules of thumb that guide decision than rules of general 
application that determine decisions.101 
1. Classic Stare Decisis 
According to the classic theory of stare decisis, judges were strictly 
bound by precedents of their predecessors.  Compared to other common 
law theories, the classic theory enhanced legal determinacy and 
constrained the lawmaking activities of judges.102  Justice Story observed, 
following precedents provided “certainty as to rights, privileges and 
property” and “control[ ] [of] the arbitrary discretion of judges.”103  
Under classic stare decisis, judges functioned in two distinct and 
separate capacities.  Where law already existed, i.e., where a particular 
precedent applied, the common law was, Justice Story observed, “a 
system of rules . . . . fixed, certain, and invariable.”104  Judges were 
appliers of law and not legislators.  If new facts fell within the rule of an 
earlier case, the inquiry was closed.105  Only if the common law provided 
no rule did judges take on the function of legislators.106  Then judges’ 
decisions were positive law for subsequent cases.107  Like the positive 
law of statutes, it was essential that those decisions be published.  It is 
not coincidental that the development of law reporting as known today 
coincided with the development of the classic theory of binding 
precedent.  Published reports contributed to the rule of law by bringing 
determinacy and control of judicial discretion.108  The very style of the 
decisions reported changed to enhance legal determinacy.  While 
                                                 
101 KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, PRÄJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA 
(1933), translated as THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA § 56, at 80 (Michael Ansaldi trans., 
1989) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW]; see also HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 135. 
102 Cf. Schauer, Failure, supra note 98, at 774-76. 
103 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 588 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 359); see also THE FIRST 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND TO 
REVISE, SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE RULES OF PRACTICE, PLEADINGS, & IN THE COURTS OF THE 
STATE 8 (1855) [hereinafter MARYLAND REPORT]. 
104 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 588 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 368). 
105 Thayer, supra note 95, at 181-82. 
106 Cf. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 
8-22 (2001) (discussing stare decisis in antebellum America and, in particular, James 
Madison’s concept of “[l]iquidation,” i.e., settling on an interpretation). 
107 So strong was this view that in England precedents bound the courts that issued them 
and not just lower courts.  American courts have never considered themselves bound by 
their own precedents.  Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, 
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 242-43 (2d ed. 1921); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES 
ON AMERICAN LAW 477 (14th ed. 1896) (1826). 
108 1 WILLIAM CRANCH, Preface to REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (circa 1801). 
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eighteenth-century English reports presented reporters’ transcripts of 
seriatim statements of individual judges, American reports offered 
unison written decisions of courts.   
Classic stare decisis theory held that judges had little room to make 
law.  If a precedent did not apply, existing precedents constrained free 
legislation.  Judges were, Justice Story wrote, “hemmed round by 
authority on every side.”109  In making law, judges did not start from 
their own notions of right, but from other precedents.  Judges legislated, 
but only within the interstices of an existing system.110  
In this way, the strict theory of stare decisis permitted adherents of 
the common law to meet the argument that the judiciary was usurping a 
function properly belonging to the legislature.  It was merely filling in 
gaps.  Within these interstices, judges were expected to behave 
predictably and to fall back on considerations of justice in filling those 
gaps.111  Hardship has not worked on the parties affected by such 
“interstitial legislation,” because “[t]he feeling is that nine times out of 
ten, if not oftener, the conduct of right-minded men would not have been 
different if the rule embodied in the decision had [not] been announced 
by statute in advance.”112   
2. Modern Stare Decisis 
The strict binding of classic stare decisis gave way to a less strict 
theory.  As judges were law-appliers and legislators alike, from the start 
suitors sought to have judges overturn prior precedents.  The American 
system, unlike the English, did not hold that courts were bound by their 
own decisions.  Soon judges overturned precedents in substantial 
numbers.  The argument was, because judges made the law, should not 
they be the ones to revise it?  
                                                 
109 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 582 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 359). 
110 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921); see 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
HART, CONCEPT supra note 37, at 135; Goodhart, supra note 99, at 50; H.L.A. Hart, American 
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes:  The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 
(1977), reprinted in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 128 (1983) [hereinafter 
Hart, American]. 
111 CALABRESI, supra note 56, at 96-98 (who speaks of “legal fabric”); MORRIS COHEN, LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 213-15 (1933); LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 94-96 (1968); 
MAXEINER, supra note 23, at 30-31; Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision III, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 940, 952-53 (1923). 
112 CARDOZO, supra note 110, at 143. 
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The central role of adversary parties in law-finding facilitated this 
development.  The maxim familiar to lawyers in civil law jurisdictions—
that the court knows the law, iura novit curia113—does not apply.114 
Lawyer responsibility for finding the law has deep roots in common law 
litigation.  Under the writ system that prevailed in the early days of the 
United States,115 the lawyer selected the appropriate writ, and thereby 
determined the law that applied to the case.  If he chose incorrectly, the 
court dismissed the case.116  But his responsibility for law-finding did not 
end with the choice of the writ itself.  The lawyer was responsible for 
arguing what the law was.  In the interest of doing justice, American 
courts, even when convinced that a rule of law was clear, developed a 
practice of permitting counsel to argue the point at length, leading to 
what Justice Story called a “vast consumption of time.”117 
Modern common law methods do not apply stare decisis strictly.  
They discourage following precedents “mechanically” lest judges 
perpetuate legal rules that have “outlived their usefulness.”118  They de-
emphasize precedent as rule.  They also anticipate that judges analyze 
the facts of the past case, compare them to the instant case, and draw 
their own conclusions as to essential similarities.119  Under these 
                                                 
113 The maxim under that name is practically unknown in American legal literature. A 
Lexis search (July 2, 2005) under “iura novit curia” and “jura novit curia” turned up only one 
case. A criminal defendant arguing pro se used it in an unreported case. State ex rel. 
Buckner v. Court of Appeals, 2001 Ohio Lexis 2788 (Ohio Oct. 24, 2001).  A similar search of 
the U.S. Law Reviews and Journals database (December 28, 2004) returned 25 entries, all 
dealing with issues of international or foreign law. 
114 F.A. Mann, Fusion of the Legal Profession, 93 LAW. Q. REV. 367, 369 (1977) (“perhaps the 
most spectacular feature of English procedure is that the rule curia novit legem has never 
been and is not part of English law . . . .”); Basil S. Markesinis, Five Days in the House of 
Lords: Some Comparative Reflections on White v. Jones 7 (Mar. 1995), 
http://w3.uniroma1.it/idc/centro/publications/16markesinis.pdf.  Indeed, lawyers are 
under an ethical obligation to bring to the court’s attention potentially applicable 
precedents and statutes.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1969); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 (2000) (Disclosure of Legal Authority). 
115 See infra notes 221-39 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., Booth v. Hall, 6 Md. 1 (1854). 
117 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 590 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 370).  Just how vast can 
be gleaned from a contemporary review of a reform report: “An argument which ought not 
to consume more than two or three hours, is . . . . frequently drawn out to the length of as 
many days, and sometimes of a week.” [Comment on] Report of the Chancellor and Judges of 
the State of New York, . . . Upon the Question, Whether any Alterations Are Necessary in the 
Present Judiciary System of the State, 2 U.S.L.J. 120, 132 (1826).  A glance at some of the early 
reports of the Supreme Court of the United States, which then printed the arguments of 
counsel, likewise demonstrates how much time was given over to such discussions. 
118 JANE C. GINSBURG, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 3 (Rev. 2d ed. 2004). 
119 LEVI, supra note 100, at 2-3. 
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approaches, judges constantly validate the legitimacy of the rules they 
apply.  Typical of these approaches is that of Judge Ruggero Aldisert, 
stated in a textbook used by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy: 
The heart of the common-law tradition is adjudication of 
specific cases.  Case-by-case development allows 
experimentation because each rule is reevaluated in 
subsequent cases to determine if the rule did or does 
produce a fair result.  If the rule operates unfairly, it can 
be modified. . . . The genius of the common law is that it 
proceeds empirically and gradually, testing the ground 
at every step, and refusing, or at any rate evincing an 
extreme reluctance, to embrace broad theoretical 
principles.120 
In one more extreme view, each case is but a “short story” that 
settles a particular dispute.121  Under this view, judges compare fact 
patterns from previous cases and decide whether there is sufficient 
similarity to warrant a similar result as in a previous case.122  This view 
borders on denying an essential feature of rules—their generality—to 
case law.  While this view may not be typical, modern stare decisis 
allows what Professors Summers and Philip Atiyah refer to as the “open 
modification of the rule to allow purposes or policies to be taken into 
account.”123  Professor Schauer argues that in the American legal system, 
rules apply only so long as their reason applies.124  The result is that a 
                                                 
120 RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 8 (3d 
ed. 1997).  Judge Aldisert formerly was Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit. 
121 See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 12-13 (1985) 
(contrasting cases and rules).  “[A] rule is an abstract or general statement of what the law 
permits or requires of classes of persons in classes of circumstances[ ]”; “a case [is] a short 
story of an incident in which the state acted or may act to settle a particular dispute.”   Id. 
122 See ALDISERT, supra note 120, at 11. 
123 P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 
91 (1987); cf. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence III, 25 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 515 (1912). 
124 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1993); cf. Philip Bobbit, What It Means To 
Follow a Rule of Law, in RULES AND REASONING, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER 55-56 
(Linda Meyer ed., 1999). 
[In the United Kingdom] I have observed an attitude toward legal 
rules that illustrates this point about rigidity.  Whereas in the USA 
there seems to be a rule for everything, there is no rule that cannot be 
flouted if it can be shown that the application of the rule is in direct 
conflict with its purpose. 
Bobbit, supra, at 55-56. 
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system adopted to enhance legal determinacy can undermine it. While 
precedents are numerous, authoritative ones are scarce. 
3. Indeterminacy of Finding Common Law 
In the England of classic stare decisis, several characteristics of 
common law rules helped improve their predictability, notwithstanding 
the absence of firm statutory bounds.  First and best known is that 
English courts of the day considered themselves strictly bound by their 
own decisions.  Second, there were only limited numbers of authoritative 
precedents owing to the paucity of reports.  Third, only a handful of 
courts (essentially three) interpreted those precedents.125  Fourth, only a 
few judges (fewer than a score) of similar political and social 
backgrounds decided cases.  Thanks to these characteristics, lawyers 
could often tell beforehand what the starting points would be, could rely 
on those points being adhered to, and could predict how those points 
would be elaborated.  These characteristics do not hold true of 
contemporary American common law.  American courts never 
considered themselves strictly bound by their own precedents, and even 
less so today.  The number of precedents is immense.  The number of 
courts is large and the number of judges in the thousands, and judges’ 
political and social backgrounds vary widely. 
Even in the classic era, American courts were not strictly bound by 
their own decisions.  Today, under modern doctrines of stare decisis, 
there is even less hesitancy to reexamine old rules and change them.  
There is great attraction to the idea that judges should reevaluate the 
rules that they apply to determine whether they result in justice.  But 
carried out to its fullest, it would produce great indeterminacy.  If judges 
actually reevaluated every rule in every case, adjudication would come 
to a crashing halt; the resources are not available.  Even if resources were 
found, such practices would fail the rule of law.  What measure should 
judges use to reevaluate existing rules?  Reevaluation would make 
litigation more expensive and its results even more uncertain.   
Regular reevaluation threatens self-application of law.  Is the rule 
still valid, or has it been wholly undermined by more recent decisions?126  
                                                 
125 The Court of Common Pleas, the Court of King’s Bench, and the Court of the 
Exchequer. Overseeing them all was the institution of the judges sitting together in the 
Court of Exchequer Chamber. 
126 See Dickinson, supra note 94, at 1055 (locating the uncertainty of common law rules 
less in their failure to be stated in a particular form of words and more in doubt as whether 
they have been completely eaten away). 
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People subject to rules, instead of figuring out how to comply with them, 
spend their energies imagining how those rules should be revised to 
comport with the conduct they would like to undertake.   
Even occasional reevaluation of precedents burdens those who 
comply with law.  Since the heart of common law method is adjudication 
and careful evaluation of facts, rules are reevaluated with respect to 
facts.  Trials to determine those facts are expensive and for that reason 
exceptional.127  Parties may be put to three levels of judicial consideration 
merely to affirm existing common law rules.128 
Indeterminacy of common law methods does not end with 
reevaluation of precedents.  Cases are but examples of rules in 
application; they are not statements of rules directly to those subject to 
them.129  Even where a common law rule is considered clear and 
longstanding, it rarely takes on one precise verbal form.130 As the points 
covered by precedents became more numerous, in theory the rule 
becomes clearer, but it still does not set strict limits.  In practice, 
however, precedent proliferation undercuts, rather than affirms, the 
authority of common law.   
In the United States, precedents are strictly binding only on inferior 
courts and not on courts in other jurisdictions or in coordinate courts in 
the same jurisdiction.  Decisions of these other courts constitute only 
“persuasive” authority; they inform, but do not determine the decision 
of the court looking to them.  Already in 1824 an advocate of codification 
caustically commented:  “The multiplication of reports, emanating from 
the numerous collateral sources of jurisdiction, is becoming an evil 
alarming and impossible long to be borne . . . . By their number and 
variety they tend to weaken the authority of each other, and to perplex 
                                                 
127 See infra text accompanying note 187. 
128 See, e.g., Keltner v. Washington County, 310 Or. 499, 800 P.2d 752 (1990). 
129 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 104-05 (characterizing common law rules as the 
teaching of standards of conduct through example, which produces more indeterminacies 
than legislation). 
130 LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW § 4, at 3-4 (“[T]he legal rules do not lay down any limits within 
which a judge moves. Rather, they set down guidelines from which a judge proceeds to 
decision.”); Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contracts, 47 YALE 
L.J. 1243, 1244 (1938). 
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the judgment.”131  Laymen likewise were dismayed by the lack of 
guidance the common law provided.132 
The indeterminacy of common law methods begins with finding an 
authoritative precedent.  Precedents are not systematized.  They are 
thousands of points of light; every year thousands of new ones are 
added to the inventory.  Thanks to the ingenuity of American publishers, 
beginning even before West’s American Digest system of the nineteenth 
century and continuing well into today’s computer-assisted searching, it 
has been easy to find not just one, but many precedents on just about any 
point.  It is a truism worthy only of a footnote that  “[e]very first year law 
student can distinguish any precedent.”133  
In most areas of American law, state law controls.  This means that 
courts of fifty different states generate precedents.  The dilemma for 
determinacy is obvious.  From the standpoint of determinacy within one 
state jurisdiction, one would prefer that a court not pay attention to any 
precedents but those of the state’s highest court.  But from the standpoint 
of determinacy across state lines and throughout the nation, one would 
prefer that that court pay attention to what courts in other states decide.  
As a matter of practice, where a particular question is not clearly 
resolved in the law of the state or states examined, lawyers are expected 
to examine the law in other states to help determine how the state where 
the law is unsettled would resolve the issue.134  Inevitably and 
frequently, lower courts are required to choose between following what 
a superior court may have decided decades ago and adopting what most 
courts in other jurisdictions have done in recent years.  While this poses 
dilemmas for judges, it imposes impossible predicaments for people 
trying to comply with law.  They are left to guess which path a yet-to-be-
determined court might follow. 
                                                 
131 William Sampson, The Common Law, 19 N. AM. REV. 411, 433 (1824). 
132 E.g. James Kirk Paulding, The Perfection of Reason, in THE MERRY TALES OF THE THREE 
WISE MEN OF GOTHAM 120 (1839) (“That it is the common law is certain, but nobody can 
tell exactly what is the common law.”); cf. BRITTON A. HILL, LAW AND LIBERTY OR OUTLINES 
OF A NEW SYSTEM FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 48 (2d ed. 1880) (urging abolition of “that unknown quantity called the 
common law” which “no citizen who is not a lawyer can possibly know much”). 
133 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism and Original Understanding: Should the Supreme 
Court Read the Federalist but not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 
1317 n.88 (1998); see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 279 (1950).  “Any case is an authoritative precedent only for a judge who, as a result 
of his own reflection, decides that it is authoritative.”  FRANK, supra, at 279. 
134 Herbert F. Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 283, 
286 (1951).  “[W]here the proposition he wants to urge is without firm precedent there, he 
must research the law of all other states and the federal courts.”  Id. 
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American jurists have long recognized the deleterious effects for 
legal determinacy of so many competing precedents.  The remarks of 
two nineteenth-century presidents of the American Bar Association are 
telling.  Judge John F. Dillon concluded that, “the multiplicity and 
conflict of decisions are among the most fruitful causes of the 
unnecessary uncertainty, which characterizes the jurisprudence of 
England and America.”135  Simeon E. Baldwin, Chief Justice of 
Connecticut, commented that:  “The multiplication of distinct 
sovereignties in the same land . . . . bewilders the American lawyer in his 
search for authority.”136  In practice, proliferation of precedents has 
sapped much of the theoretical strength of the common law method of 
careful consideration and comparison of differences and similarities 
between facts of different cases.137  Precedents often serve simply as 
authority, which vary depending not on the quality of the reasoning, but 
on their place in the judicial hierarchy of the rendering court.138  
B. Finding Statutory Rules 
Systematic statute law, particularly in the form of codes, promises 
that law-finding will be simpler.  That has been the siren call of 
advocates of codification for two centuries.  Notwithstanding that codes 
age, and are revised and supplemented, the cognoscibility of continental 
code law is orders of magnitude greater than that of its common law 
counterparts.  Practitioners can quickly find the law, even in areas in 
which they are not experts.  In ordinary cases, judges in civil law 
jurisdictions spend little or no time interpreting, let alone finding 
authoritative rules.  Only exceptionally do lawyers propose unorthodox 
interpretations. As a result, subjects of the law can trust to relative 
stability in statutes’ interpretations.  In the United States, however, 
promises that statutory law-finding would be easy and that statutes 
would lead to greatly enhanced legal determinacy have been, at best, 
                                                 
135 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 242 (1894).  
“Dillon was a ‘lawyers’ lawyer,” noted judge and jurist, and president of the American Bar 
Association 1891-1892.  ROGERS, supra note 40, at 66. 
136 SIMEON E. BALDWIN, MODERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 250 (1898).  Chief Justice 
Baldwin was also president of four national organizations: the American Bar Association 
(1890-1891), the American Social Science Association, the Association of American Law 
Schools, and the American Historical Association.  ROGERS, supra note 40, at 61.  He was 
also founding director of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association. 
137 See generally Cappalli, supra note 51. 
138 John Bassett Moore, The Passion for Uniformity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME 
CURRENT ILLUSIONS 316, 331-32 (1924), as quoted in Hessel E. Yntema, The Jurisprudence of 
Codification, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CENTENARY ESSAYS 251, 255 (Alison Reppy ed., 1948).  
Moore was the first American justice of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Hague. 
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only partially realized.  The disappointing performance in law-finding 
through statutes can be attributed to three factors:  lack of system in 
ordering and interpreting statutes; assimilation of statutes to common 
law resulting in the undermining the reliability of statutes as 
authoritative rules; and encouragement of lawyers to develop novel legal 
theories.  
1. Lack of System in Ordering and Interpreting Statutes 
As seen above, the American legal system has not developed 
effective means of lawmaking.  Legal drafting techniques, and law-
finding are closely related.139 American legislatures turn out 
unsystematized statutes in quantities rivaling the precedents of the 
courts.140  Yet there is little in America in the way of systematic 
legislation.  In the nineteenth century, state and federal governments 
compiled and sometimes revised their statutes.141  These revisions and 
compilations are called “codes,” although they have almost nothing in 
common with Continental codes.142  Among American laws, the Uniform 
Commercial Code has the best claim to status as a code.143  Among 
compilations called codes, the United States Code is the most famous.  Its 
origin is in the Revised Statutes of 1875, a volume of over 1,437 oversized 
pages, but still a single volume.144  Today the United States Code is over 
                                                 
139 Reinhard Zimmermann, Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common 
Law: A Continental Perspective, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 315, 325 (1997). 
140 See, e.g., Charles P. Sherman, One Code for all the United States the Only Remedy To Cure 
American Law of Its Confusion and Uncertainty, 25 GREEN BAG 460 (1913). 
The uncertainty of our law, its confusion, its startling bulkiness, 
redundancy and prolixity, increased annually by some 20,000 new 
statutes and thousands of new reported cases, make our law today the 
most intolerable in the world and perhaps the worst ever known to 
human history—all because its form and lack of uniformity are so 
objectionably bad. 
Id. 
141 The work of revision sometimes approached that of codification.  See, e.g., JOHN DUER 
et al., Preface to 1 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK iii (1829). 
142 Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 
1091 (1988). 
143 William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil Codes, 56 LA. L. REV. 
231, 235 (1995); see Bergel, supra note 142, at 1076; Richard Buxbaum, Is the Uniform 
Commercial Code a Code?, in RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE GESELLSCHAFT UND 
HANDELSRECHT 197, 220 (1994); Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?—
Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law’s Subsequent 
Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1138, 1160 (1994).  But see Ugo Mattei, A Theory of 
Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 383, 429 (2003) (arguing that the U.C.C. shares little with Continental codes). 
144 REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FORTY-
THIRD CONGRESS, 1873-74 (1875). 
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30,000 pages,145 and this is just for the federal government.  Each state 
has its own code of laws, many of which are comparable to the United 
States Code in size.  Private publishers long ago began annotating these 
codes—that is, adding references to cases that cite particular statutes.  
Code annotations are not code commentaries in a civil law sense and do 
not bring comparable cognoscibility.  Their goal is not to systematize 
statutes but to help lawyers find cases. 
Justice Scalia excoriates the American legal system for its lack of an 
intelligible theory of statutory interpretation.146  Statutory interpretation 
in the United States is dominated by canons of construction.147  Justice 
Story identified twenty-one canons and observed that there are many 
others of a “special character.”  They all, he said, “point to one great 
object—certainty and uniformity of interpretation.”148 Certainty, 
however, they have not brought.  Only a few years later, Professor 
Timothy Walker, caustically commented:  “There are many rules of 
interpretation; but they are of little use.  Common sense is the best 
guide.”149  A century later Professor Karl Llewellyn observed “two 
opposing canons on almost every point.”150  
Since 1980 there has been an upswing in interest in statutory 
interpretation.151  Where once the literature was meager, today it is 
“daunting.”152  Whether the new literature will lead to improved results 
remains to be seen.  In 1995, the authors of the Uniform Statute and Rule 
Construction Act still referred to prevailing approaches as 
“incoherent.”153  That proposed act, more recent proposals for a 
                                                 
145 The 2000 edition has 35 volumes (27 volumes of text, 8 volumes of tables and indices, 
and 1 mixed volume). The text volumes range from around 1,000 pages to 1,300 pages.  In 
1964 it was 9,797 pages. W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need To Bring 
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1992). 
146 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
147 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 583-85 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 362). 
148 Id. 
149 WALKER, supra note 55, at 53.  Walker was Professor in the Law Department of the 
Cincinnati Law College; the book cited was the nation’s first comprehensive introduction to 
law study for students and went through eleven editions, the last appearing in 1905. 
150 Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (quoting 
numbers 1 and 16). 
151 It coincides with the publication of JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 
(1982). 
152 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14-47 (1994); Strauss, 
supra note 81, at 225. 
153 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, SUMMARY UNIFORM 
STATUTE AND RULE CONSTRUCTION ACT (1995), available at http://www.nccusl.org/ 
Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-usarca1995.asp. 
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“Restatement of Statutory Interpretation,” and Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, share the same assumption that statutory interpretation is 
an enterprise that itself must be regulated by law to provide legal 
determinacy, or at least, to help lawyers do law.154  This may be one 
instance where less would be more.  American canons of statutory 
interpretation differ from their foreign counterparts not so much in 
content as in quantity.155  The rule-oriented German legal system gets 
along well enough without rules of statutory interpretation.  Elements of 
interpretation dating from Justice Story’s time and analyzed by Friedrich 
Carl von Savigny provide adequate legal determinacy.156  This may be 
because in Germany, canons of interpretation guide, but do not 
determine decisions.157 
2. Judicial Assimilation of Statutes to Common Law 
While substantive common law has been in retreat for two centuries, 
common law methods have survived and have flourished.  The common 
law is dead; long live common law methods!  That common law 
methods should apply to statutory enactments is generally accepted.158  
The result for legal determinacy is nothing short of disastrous, for it 
undercuts the principal benefit of statutes as general and authoritative 
rules.   
In applying statutes, American judges sometimes act superior to 
statutes instead of subordinate to them.  This rests on a long tradition of 
common law judges preferring common law to statute law.159  American 
judges routinely review legislation for consistency with constitutions, 
state and federal.  That practice has its forerunner in the English 
                                                 
154 See Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 333, 335 (2003); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
155 Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, in 
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461, 462 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. 
Summers eds., 1991).  A study by an international group of scholars found the approaches 
to statutory interpretation in the United States and eight other countries to share 
“important similarities.”  Id. 
156 Zimmermann, supra note 139, at 320. 
157 See ANUSHEH RAFI, KRITERIEN FÜR EIN GUTES URTEIL 79, 85-86 (2004) (“[The canons of 
interpretation] provide arguments which serve to convince others of a particular 
interpretation of the statute.”). 
158 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading 
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) (“Even in today’s legal landscape, 
dominated by statutes, the common-law process remains the core element in state court 
decisionmaking.”); see also Glendon, supra note 63, at 95. 
159 See Zimmermann, supra note 139, at 318. 
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doctrine, highly influential in early America, of the “supremacy of the 
common law” asserted by Chief Justice Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham’s 
Case of 1610:160 
And it appears in our books that in many cases the 
common law will controul acts of parliament and 
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void:  for when an 
act of parliament is against common right or reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void.161 
Today, some American judges are more interested in controlling statutes 
than in applying them.162 
An early canon of interpretation was that statutes in derogation of 
the common law are to be strictly construed and not extended beyond 
their rules.163  According to Justice Story: “In all cases of a doubtful 
nature, the common law will prevail, and the statute not be construed to 
repeal it.”164  This canon made fodder of those statutes that judges found 
to infringe on the common law.  Even in the nineteenth century this 
doctrine was said to be obsolete and deserving of rejection.165  Still the 
reasoning behind the doctrine—that statutes should be narrowly 
construed—continues.  Uniform laws, such as the Uniform Commercial 
Code, include provisions requiring that they “be liberally construed and 
                                                 
160 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 50-51 (5th ed. 
1956).  It is described as a “rule of construction of statutes” in Edward S. Corwin, The 
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 149-85, 365-
409 (1928-1929), reprinted in EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (1955). 
161 As quoted in S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 1938 LAW Q. REV. 543, 543-52, reprinted in 
S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 269, 275 (Hambledon Press 1985), and also 
in CORWIN, supra note 160. 
162 CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES 6 (1965); cf. Richard A. 
Posner, Law and Economics—ethics, economics, and adjudication, IVR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
JURISPRUDENCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, http://www.ivr-
enc.info/en/article.php?id=42 (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (“American judges [have] a taste, 
and a felt competence, for participating in the creation and not merely the application of 
law. . . . [They] indulge their taste in innovative, policy-oriented judicial rulemaking . . . .). 
163 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION 
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267 (John Norton Pomeroy 
ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 2d ed. 1874); Story, Law, supra note 79, at 583-84 (MCCLELLAN, 
Appendix III, at 362) (especially numbers 14, 15, 21). 
164 Story, Law, supra note 79, at 584 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 362) (number 14). 
165 SEDGWICK, supra note 163, at 267-71 n.b (John Norton Pomeroy). 
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applied,”166 for fear that otherwise they would be limited to their precise 
words.167 
Another way that American judges shape statutes, sometimes 
beyond the point of recognition, is through free use of legislative 
history.168  Legislative history used in the United States for statutory 
interpretation is not limited to careful ministry or comprehensive 
committee reports about proposed legislation, but includes cryptic 
conference reports mediating final language between two houses of 
Congress, speeches made on the legislature’s floor, and even speeches 
and testimony in committee hearings.  Opportunities for manipulation of 
such materials are obvious;169 statutory “interpretation” of this sort 
renders statutes opaque and guts guidance to the law-abiding.  Adverse 
reaction to such manipulation has encouraged development of a new 
approach to statutory interpretation, known as “new textualism,” which 
excludes reference to legislative history.170  
Perhaps even more destructive of development of systematic 
lawmaking is that American judges give judicial decisions interpreting 
statutes the binding force of precedents.  Lower courts must follow 
higher court interpretations, not because their interpretations are better, 
but because they are authoritative.  By giving interpretations of statutes 
the force of law, higher courts arrogate to themselves determination of 
what the law is until the legislature acts again.171  This practice has 
another pernicious, but largely unappreciated, effect on law-finding in 
concrete cases.  When judges find law, they often begin not with a statute 
that the legislature drafted to cover a multitude of cases, but with a 
precedent that an appellate court wrote to decide one particular case.172  
As a result, the generality of law, and therefore its predictability, suffers. 
                                                 
166 U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2004). 
167 See id. § 1-103 cmt. 1 
168 See generally CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2002). 
169 Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist 
View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993); Strauss, supra note 81, at 
231-32. 
170 Alan Schwartz, Constitutional Law and the Supreme Court: The New Textualism and the 
Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
149, 152 (2001). 
171 See Strauss, supra note 81, at 244.  “Often presented as if it were an act of self-
abnegation . . . giving interpretations precedential force actually dramatizes judicial power; 
it makes the courts a political competitor with the legislature in the creation of law.”  Id. 
172 Judges not infrequently lament that, in the absence of a guiding precedents, they have 
had to turn to reading the legislative text! 
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Yet another consequence of applying stare decisis to decisions 
interpreting statutes is that even in the federal system, law is not 
uniform.  Federal law varies by judicial circuit.173  Theoretically the 
Supreme Court resolves conflicting interpretations, but practically it 
addresses only the most important of them—at best, a few dozen each 
year.174  In the 1970s and 1980s, there were proposals for creation of a 
“National Court of Appeals” or an “Intercircuit Panel” that would 
handle these kinds of cases, but no such court was established.175  
Opponents argued that “many circuit courts act as ‘laboratories’ of new 
or refined legal principles,” and that the “diversity” of a “vast country” 
benefits from a “flexible system” and federal law with “regional 
variations.”176  To complete the analogy, they should have asked the 
laboratory subjects how they felt! 
3. Adversarial Argument of Novel Legal Theories 
People trying to comply with law may be dismayed to learn that the 
American procedural system encourages lawyers to challenge the plain 
meaning of statutes.  The role of the parties in finding law—always 
substantial177—has, since Justice Story’s time, actually increased.  Justice 
Story was concerned with time wasted in argument about what common 
law was.178  American law now permits adversary lawyers to argue what 
the law should be.179  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
                                                 
173 Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV. 411, 427 
(1987) [hereinafter Carrington, Function].  “In fact, the federal courts never resolve authoritatively 
many questions of interpretation of federal legislation.”  Id. 
174 The Court’s principal role now is that of a constitutional court. It decides each year 
with opinion fewer than 100 cases of all types each year.  See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra 
Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2004). Typically European supreme 
courts, with many more judges and no constitutional responsibilities, decide many times 
that number of cases. 
175 Erwin N. Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 
S.C. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1987). 
176 J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a 
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 929-30 (1983); cf. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 46 (1995), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CH05.PDF (asserting there is no problem); Garvey Algero, 
A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of 
Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605 (2003) (arguing that “the thousands of 
intercircuit conflicts in the United States federal court system are a problem in need of 
resolution”) (emphasis omitted); Carrington, Function, supra note 173, at 427-28; Paul 
Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe Pound’s Structural 
Solution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 517 (1999). 
177 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
178 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
179 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
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provides that when a lawyer submits a paper to a court, the lawyer 
represents:  “[T]he claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment 
of new law.”180  The provision permits parties to seek legal redress even 
though there is no existing legal ground.  The Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 11 states that there is no violation so long as a litigant has 
“researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in 
minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with 
other attorneys.”181  
Professor William G. Ross observes that lawyers are expected to 
spend time developing arguments, some of which may turn out in the 
end to be fruitless.182   Professor Anthony D’Amato explains how party 
self-interest impels attorneys to invent hypothetical cases for argument, 
and thus moves the law “toward complete uncertainty.”183 
The deleterious effect on rule determinacy of the indulgent attitude 
of Rule 11 is magnified by the unusual cost system that prevails in the 
United States.  In most countries, in litigation, the loser normally pays 
the attorneys’ fees for both sides.184  That allocation of costs is consistent 
with the court’s determination that the winning party was in the right; 
the party in the right should not have to suffer.  In the United States, 
however, generally each side must pay its own attorneys’ fees.  As a 
result, parties who raise claims not found in existing rules incur little risk 
so long as they satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 11.  A party 
may lose, but the other side is out its time and fees for its attorneys.  This 
has an impact long before trial.  American lawyers sometimes counsel 
their clients to avoid conduct when there is a mere possibility that 
someone may assert a dubious claim.185  
                                                 
180 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
181 Id. (1993 amend. cmt.). 
182 WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY 
ATTORNEYS 113 (1996). 
183 Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22-25 (1983). 
184 See generally W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is 
the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
361 (1999). 
185 Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States—
Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 
AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 154 (1994).  Suggestions to introduce a loser pay rule meet vigorous 
opposition, which argue that a loser pay rule might “excessively discourage parties with 
plausible but not clearly winning claims.”  REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, APRIL 2, 1990, at 105 (1990), available at http://air.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog. 
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Finding rules is only an intermediate step on the way to applying 
rules to concrete cases and giving subjects guidance in law.  Part V 
addresses applying law to facts.  
V.  LAW-APPLYING 
The rule of law requires rules that apply surely and predictably.  If 
rules are not correctly put into practice, voluntary compliance is 
undermined.186  The United States has no generally accepted method for 
applying rules.  Frequently it fails to apply rules at all.  The absence of a 
general method of rule application is one of the most important factors in 
legal indeterminacy in America.   
When there is a generally accepted method of applying law, 
different people looking at the same rules, if the rules are otherwise 
determinant, should reach the same conclusions.  In such cases people 
can conduct their lives within the rules confident that they normally will 
not be disturbed by government authorities or by third parties asserting 
that their conduct is outside the law.  They can rely on the rules.  If, 
however, application of law is erratic and unpredictable—if application 
is divorced from the rules of law—people cannot safely rely on the law 
even if the rules themselves appear determinant. 
If there is a natural model for a legal system’s method of law-
applying, that model is the system’s law of civil procedure.  Modern 
systems of civil procedure, including the American, decide cases by 
applying rules to facts.  The American system, however, is less than a 
fully satisfactory model.  There are two principal reasons for this. 
One reason American civil procedure is a poor model of law-
applying is that today applying law to facts is a rarity.  Changes in the 
system of civil procedure have shifted law-applying to the trial stage of 
proceedings and away from the pleading stage, which once had an 
important role in law application.  But trials—never common in recent 
                                                                                                             
nsf/autoframepage!openform&url=/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/Publication!openform&parent
unid=40C7E33B291C77AF85256D66007255F2. 
186 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189 (2004).  
“[T]he action-guiding work of substantive law is inextricably entangled in the action-
guiding work of procedural law.”  Id.  Abraham Lincoln warned: if perpetrators of 
unlawful acts “go[ ] unpunished, the lawless in spirit, are encouraged to become lawless in 
practice; . . . . While, on the other hand, good men, men who love tranquility, who desire to 
abide by the laws . . . become tired of, and disgusted with, a Government that offers them 
no protection . . . .”  Lincoln, supra note 45 (speech before the Young Men’s Lyceum in 
1838). 
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times—are “vanishing.”187  While percentages vary, probably in no 
jurisdiction do even five percent of cases reach the trial stage.  If no trial 
occurs, application of law to facts takes place, if at all, in determinations 
of motions for dismissal (which test the pleadings against very generous 
standards) or in motions for summary judgment.  While these are not 
uncommon, they do not occur in most cases; and when they do occur, 
they do not always deal completely with the case.   
Another reason that American civil procedure is a poor model of 
law-applying is that even when it does purport to apply law to facts, its 
commitment to that application is imperfect at best.  When it uses a jury, 
it does not insist on applying law to facts.  Its insistence is greater when 
it uses trial by judge alone. 
This Part asserts that applying law to facts is a necessary element of 
deciding according to law.  It contends that decisions according to law 
are decisions that subsume facts under legal rules.  Further, it shows that 
such syllogistic law application has suffered a continuing diminution in 
American civil procedure as the power of juries to decide free of rules 
has been enhanced and the role of pleading in law-applying has been 
reduced.  
A. Syllogistic Law Application 
To apply law to facts means to reach a decision according to rules of 
substantive law.188  Not every decision by a legal tribunal qualifies.  If a 
decision-maker were to flip a coin, that would not qualify as a decision 
according to law.189  Deciding according to law requires finding an 
applicable rule, determining the facts, and applying the rule to the 
                                                 
187 See, e.g., Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES v (2004).  
This is the introduction to a symposium issue and the report of the Vanishing Trial Project 
of the Section on Litigation of the American Bar Association.  Id.  Trials may never have 
been common.  See, e.g., SIR WALTER SCOTT, NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, EMPEROR OF THE 
FRENCH 417 (1858) (reporting that the number of actions at common law tried yearly in 
England averaged only two to thirty per county). 
188 But see Schauer, Rules, supra note 26, at 69 (discussing the conflation of decision 
according to rule with the rule of law).  Edward H. Levi asserted that: “The pretense is that 
the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge . . . . In an important sense legal rules 
are never clear . . . . ”  LEVI, supra note 100, at 1. 
189 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JURY HANDBOOK—HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL 
JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, In the Jury Room, 
http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/jury_handbook.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2006); Mark S. 
Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—The Case for the Fact 
Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 58 (1990) (citing G. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS AND 
SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 14 (1905)) (all referring to coin-tossing). 
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facts.190  This is considerably more difficult than is generally supposed.  
The legal rule cannot always be read from a statute or precedent.  It may 
be necessary to search statutes and precedents, analyze them, compare 
them to facts, revisit statutes and precedents in light of the facts, and 
again examine facts in light of the law.191  The end result is to bring facts 
and law together. 
When people apply rules to themselves, they normally follow a 
syllogistic process:  a legal rule is the major premise, facts are the minor 
premise, and these facts are subsumed logically under the legal rule to 
reach a correct legal decision.  Syllogistic application of law to facts 
brings law and facts together.   
American jurists have long criticized use of the syllogistic model.  
Dean Roscoe Pound called it “mechanical jurisprudence.”192  Yet when 
Pound coined the phrase a century ago, he did not challenge the use of 
deduction to decide cases according to law.  He praised the then new 
German Civil Code for laying down “principles from which to deduce, 
not rules, but decisions.”193  It was deduction of rules from concepts194—
that is, using syllogistic reasoning to create law and not to apply it—that 
Pound disparaged.195 
Although frequently disparaged, syllogistic law application is 
essential to fulfillment of the rule of law.  Objections to it are founded 
less on its use at all and more on its exclusive use in all cases all the time.  
In hard cases, it may mislead decision-makers into viewing application 
of law to facts as a simple process that is devoid of nuance or valuing.  It 
may result in failing to take into account differences or similarities in 
individual cases that are apparent only when rules are viewed against 
                                                 
190 Brodin, supra note 189, at 225; Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 
YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920). 
191 Vicki Waye, Judicial Fact-Finding: Trial by Judge Alone in Serious Criminal Cases, 27 
MELB. U. L. REV. 423, 434 (2003).  “Any model of legal decision-making that strictly 
bifurcates the application of legal rules from fact-finding is likely to mask the latent 
evaluative content of legal rule application.”  Id. 
192 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 613 (1908) [herienafter 
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence]. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 612, 616. 
195 Id. at 619. 
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their reasons.196  It may lead to their applying law to fact patterns where 
there is no applicable law. 
In civil law jurisdictions, syllogistic law application once held 
unchallenged pride of place.  It now shares place with other methods 
such as analogy, induction, and abduction.  It is no longer seen as a 
sufficient explanation for all cases all of the time.  Its results cannot be 
accepted automatically, but are checked against ideas of justice.  But, 
though tempered in its use, syllogistic law application dominates daily 
practice.  No competing theory better describes what it means to apply 
law to facts in ordinary cases.197  
In common law jurisdictions, the role of syllogistic law application is 
not radically different.198  Its use is pervasive.199  It is readily used in 
practice even if its use is only reluctantly acknowledged in the 
academy.200  Syllogistic reasoning is the reasoning that jury instructions 
expect juries to apply.201  It enables self-application and permits legal 
systems to respond to the need identified by Hart, “for certain rules 
which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private 
                                                 
196 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 130.  For a categorization of such missteps, see 
Samuel C. Darmen, The Utilization of Syllogisms in Contemporary Legal Analysis: Law, Logic 
and the Boolean Universe, 1998 DETROIT COLLEGE L. REV. 63, 66 (1998). 
197 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTION TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 194-239 (William Rehg trans., 1994); ARTHUR 
KAUFMANN, DAS VERFAHREN DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG. EINE RATIONALE ANALYSE 2-6, 29-30, 
54-62 (1999) (reviewing criticisms and discussing alternatives to deduction); SCHAPP, supra 
note 50, at 1. 
198 NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW:  A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 
32-33, 43-47 (2005) (the legal syllogism is “central to legal reasoning”); Wolfgang 
Fikentscher, The Evolutionary and Cultural Origins of Heuristics that Influence Law-making, in 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 207, 220 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel, eds., 2006). 
199 See, e.g., RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD 55 (1997) 
(discussing its place in applying precedents). 
200 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1498 (1996). 
Most lawyers and judges experience law as a process of logical 
deduction. They believe they apply the law laid down by legislatures 
and appellate courts to the facts of cases and generate answers. Most 
law professors at elite schools (and many of the best trial lawyers) hold 
this ‘Formalist’ view of law in contempt. 
Id.  For texts and a monograph that recognize syllogistic law application, see ALDISERT, 
supra note 120, at ch. 5; STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL 
REASONING ch. 3 (1985); NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 2 
(1978). 
201 Standard jury instructions typically provide that jurors are to “apply the law” and 
then direct that they find the required facts that would fulfill the legal elements of a given 
cause. 
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individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up 
of social issues.”202  
In the United States, however, legal procedure does not always 
require syllogistic law application. Decisions according to legal rules are 
allowed to give way when juries are introduced into decision-making. 
Juries have considerable freedom to put aside legal syllogisms and to 
decide according to their free assessment of the equities of particular 
cases irrespective of law. Just how much freedom they have has long 
been hotly debated. 
B. Jury Decision-making 
American civil procedure has a long history of tempering decisions 
according to law with decisions free, to a greater or lesser extent, of the 
formal syllogisms of legal rules.  In contemporary America, the jury is 
the principal exponent of such decision-making.  A decision that does 
not rest on syllogistic law application is legitimized, not as a correct 
application of law to facts, but as a just decision reached after all sides 
have had their “day in court” before a neutral jury.   
The right to a day in court is one of the most firmly rooted, long-
standing, and widely-held ideals in American law.203  It is a right to be 
heard,204  but it is much more than that.  It prefers oral testimony in open 
court, subject to cross-examination, to other forms of proof.205  A day in 
court includes the “means of contesting before a jury all such facts as 
may be necessary to the attainment of justice.”206  It is an opportunity for 
the parties to tell their stories unencumbered by the rule of law model.207  
The contemporary American trial is structured to permit each side to 
tell its story; the judge is passive.  The parties begin their cases with their 
                                                 
202 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 37, at 130; accord Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation (and Partial 
Defense) of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 71 (2003). 
203 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989); State v. Anon., 2 N.C. 28, 29 (1794).  
It is an American’s “birthright.”  Ex parte Schenk, 65 N.C. 353 (1871) (Argument no. 6 of 
counsel); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141 
(2000). 
204 Curtis v. Cisna’s Adm’rs, 1 Ohio 429, 436 (1824). 
205 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1072 (2003). 
206 Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 265 (1829). 
207 See generally Dana K. Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the 
Story, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and 
the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2100 (1989). 
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opening statements.  Following that, first one side, then the other, 
presents its witnesses.  In the course of that testimony, the other side, in 
cross-examination, has the opportunity to challenge the other party’s 
story.208  Finally, each of the parties provides a closing statement before 
the judge instructs the jury in the law and sends the jury out to decide 
the case.  If trial is before a judge alone, the judge retires to reach his or 
her decision.  Central to these presentations is that each party “identify a 
legal theory of the case, a factual theory of the case, and a theme, or 
persuasive theory of the case.”209  The legal theory is only a part of the 
more important larger theme:  “the moral-political claim the case makes 
on the jury’s sensibilities.”210  
When juries are involved in cases, syllogistic law application 
involves two separate actors: judge and jury.211  American civil 
procedure distinguishes the roles of these two actors by separating, rather 
than bringing together, questions of law and fact.  The classic statement 
of the English common law applies:  judges decide legal questions, juries 
decide factual issues.212  That leaves undetermined, however, who 
applies the law to the facts.  Sometimes it is the judge, sometimes the 
jury; and sometimes, it is the parties themselves. 
Juries have power to decide against the law.213  Known as “jury 
nullification,”214 the conventional view championed by Justice Story is 
that such decisions are made without authority and should be 
exceptional.215  A more recent and radical view, however, holds that such 
                                                 
208 Robert P. Burns, Reinvigorating the Jury: A Conservative Perspective on the Future of the 
American Jury Trial, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1319, 1326 (2003) (one side has an opportunity for 
“construction” of its narrative and the other for “deconstruction”). 
209 Id. at 1323. 
210 Id. at 1324. 
211 Cf. McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176, 177 
(1973). 
212 EDWARD COKE, 1 THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND lib 2, 
cap 12 § 234, at 155(b) (Charles Butler ed., 18th ed. 1823).  “The most usual triall [sic] of 
matters of fact is by 12 such men; for ad questionem facti non respondent judices; and matters 
in law the judges ought to decide and discuss; for ad questionem juris non respondent 
juratores.”  Id. 
213 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997); Comm. on Prof’l 
Responsibility of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on Jury Nullification, 
54 REC. 197, 199 (1999). 
214 The practice is possible because in certain cases, the jury has the last word. Its decision 
is final and cannot be corrected. This occurs most commonly when the jury acquits a 
defendant in a criminal case; the prosecution has no possibility of appeal. As discussed 
below, limitations on appellate review can give it a similar power in civil cases. 
215 United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545).  “[The 
jurors] have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the court.  
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decisions should be the norm and that their legitimacy should be 
acknowledged.216  Under this latter view, jury nullification not only 
supplements syllogistic law application in extraordinary cases, but 
competes directly with it in ordinary ones.  It is diametrically opposed to 
the rule of law as a law of rules.217  
Jury nullification is only the most extreme example of juries deciding 
free from rules of law; other instances are discussed below.  Jury 
decision-making is expected to “reconcile law and justice in concrete 
cases.”218  It is supposed to be “less legalistic and more infused with 
localized, lay notions of justice.”219  It is to serve as a check on 
government and on rules and as a means to involve citizens in 
democratic government.220  
C. Pleading 
Over the course of the last two centuries, the American legal system 
has steadily reduced the role of rules and their syllogistic application in 
civil procedure.  While the goal of civil procedure remains application of 
law to facts, the trend has been away from rule-oriented decision-making 
toward freer dispute resolution where rules have a diminished role.  In 
this “[p]rogressive version of procedure,” facts have more importance 
than law, and disputing has a broader rather than a narrow focus.221  
While this is seen by some as a step towards more just resolution of 
individual cases, its effect has been to render rules less determinate and 
their application problematic.  This diminution of the role of rules is 
apparent in the demise of common law pleading, the rise and fall of code 
pleading, and the eventual triumph of notice pleading.  Notice pleading 
has largely eliminated a role for law-applying at the pleading stage.  
Pleading once was essential for narrowing issues and structuring a case 
                                                                                                             
But I deny, that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law 
according to their own notions, or pleasure.”  Id. 
216 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 
247 (1995). 
217 IRA PERLEY, TRIAL BY JURY:  A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY 7 (1867) (“If the rule of law 
were left to be discovered in each case by the jury, and decided according to their 
independent judgment, no man could know in advance what his legal rights would turn 
out to be.”).  See generally Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the New Millennium,  CT. 
REV., Summer 1999, at 28. 
218 ABRAMSON, supra note 216, at 248. 
219 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1198 
(1997); accord ABRAMSON, supra note 216, at 60; Burns, supra note 208, at 1357. 
220 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 , 410 (1972); Moore, supra note 138, at 1185. 
221 Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not 
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 943, 948 (2004). 
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for trial.  When it did this, it had an important role in applying law to 
facts. 
1. The Demise of Common Law Pleading 
When common law pleading prevailed, one could say that the 
parties themselves applied the law.222  Common law pleading was 
characterized by the forms of action of the old writs and by the issue 
forming process of special pleading.  The writ was the statement of the 
legal claim on which plaintiffs relied for recovery.  Writs were limited in 
number.  By choosing the writ, plaintiffs in effect chose the law to be 
applied.  Through pleading, parties reached the issue to be decided.  
Each party answered the pleading of the other party by denying, 
affirming, or affirming and adding new matter, until a single material 
point was reached that one party affirmed and the other denied.  When 
that issue was a question of law, it was for the judge to decide.  When it 
was one of a fact, a jury would be summoned for a trial of that fact.  It 
was the “glory” of the system that, in advance of trial, the parties 
themselves singled out the one material point as to which they were in 
dispute.223 Special pleading made jury trial efficient.224  It was “the 
mainspring and the regulative force of the whole machinery of the 
Common law.”225 
Common law pleading relied on syllogistic law application.  The 
form of action provided the major premise; it set out the essential facts 
                                                 
222 Cf. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an 
Uncharted Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 1987 (2004).  “The common law 
system almost automatically accomplished the diagnosis: the formal procedures integrated 
law and fact.”  Id. 
223 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 12-13 (2d ed. 1947); see 
also MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 103; ROBERT W. MILLAR, COMMON LAW PLEADING 1-13 
(1912) (Part I); R. ROSS PERRY, COMMON LAW PLEADING:  ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES 179, 
191-203 (1897); G. VAN SANTVOORD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 37 (1852) (contrasting common law 
pleading with equity pleading). 
224 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 103, at 17-18; cf. CHARLES EDWARDS, THE JURYMAN’S 
GUIDE THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND CONTAINING GENERAL MATTER FOR THE 
LAWYER AND LAW OFFICER 166 (1831) (“All that the jury have to do, is to observe well those 
parts of the pleadings or matters in issue which deny the plaintiff’s claim; for they have 
nothing to do with that which is confessed, or not denied in the pleadings.”); Stephen N. 
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law] (the writ, the jury and single issue pleading were “means of confining and 
focusing disputes, rationalizing and organizing law, and of applying rules in an orderly, 
consistent and predictable manner”). 
225 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 103, at 9. 
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that formed the minor premise.226  The plaintiff’s declaration set forth the 
cause of the complaint and had to include, as was said in a leading 
English text widely circulated in the United States early in the nineteenth 
century, “all essentials, or whatever is of the substance of the action.”227  
The law required of every plea two things:  “the one, that it be in matter 
sufficient, the other that it be deduced and expressed according to the 
forms of law.”228  Adherents of special pleading considered it to be, as 
the United States Supreme Court noted, “the best logic in the world, 
except mathematics.”229  
Special pleading required that parties choose a legal theory and then 
pick a single legal issue or factual point to contest.  Common law 
pleading sometimes partially ameliorated the harsh effects of these 
perilous choices by allowing parties to plead the “general issue,” i.e., to 
deny the pleading of the other party generally and not specially.  This 
served to require the other party to prove all of the elements set out in 
that party’s pleading.  When the general issue was pleaded, no longer 
did a single question of law or a single issue of fact determine the 
outcome of the dispute.  But use of the general issue created a conceptual 
and practical problem for applying law to facts.   
A conceptual problem arose because general pleading involved the 
jury in law application.  When the general issue was used, jurors almost 
necessarily confronted legal questions.  There was no longer a single 
issue of fact for them to determine but a constellation of issues, the 
importance of which might be known only by referring to the parties’ 
legal claims.  This did not, however, make jurors into “judges” of the 
law.  According to Justice Story, using the terminology of this Article, the 
judge finds the law while the jury applies the law.230  Indeed, juries were 
protected from being required to apply the law. They could not be 
compelled to give a general verdict, provided that they found a special 
verdict “showing the facts respecting which issue is joined and 
requir[ing] in such special verdict the judgment of the court upon the 
facts.”231 
                                                 
226 Gould’s Pleading, 8 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 74 (1832); see Subrin & Main, supra note 222, 
at 1987 (“In the early English system, writs declared the underlying essential facts.”). 
227 5 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS 
BY HENRY GWILLIM 326 (Bird Wilson, ed., 1st Am. ed. 1811). 
228 Id. at 322. 
229 McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 524 (1858) (quoting Sir William Jones). 
230 United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545) (in 
Justice Story’s language, the judge “judges” the law, while the jury “determines” it). 
231 EDWARDS, supra note 224, at 167. 
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A practical problem arose because the general issue did not narrowly 
restrict trial as special pleading had.  It demanded much more 
preparation than trial of a special issue.  By definition, in trial of a special 
issue, there was only one fact to address.  In trial of the general issue, 
many facts could be at issue.  Legal questions could arise.  The 1851 
reform commission in Massachusetts rejected greater use of the general 
issue because of the “very great evils” it would create.232  The 
Commission noted that evils “are felt in preparation for, during, and 
after the trial.”233  Specifically, “Neither party has any means of knowing 
what questions of fact and law are to be tried.  Each must therefore 
conjecture, as well as he can, all reasonable possibilities and prepare for 
them.”234  As a result, special pleading was seen to be indispensable to 
jury trials of civil cases.235  
The system of special pleading was complex, artificial, and 
formalistic.  The writs had grown haphazardly over time and did not 
form a consistent system.  Even adherents of special pleading 
acknowledged that “through ignorance or mistake, or sometimes by 
design, an issue is formed or a point presented which does not involve 
the merits of the cause, [and] a decision is made contrary to the justice 
and equity of the cause.”236  Gentle critics felt that, while it might work 
well in “skilful and cautious hands,” in practice, this “sharp and 
powerful machine inflicted many wounds on the ignorant and 
                                                 
232 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE AND REFORM THE PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprinted in 2 A MEMOIR OF 
BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 
149-50 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS REPORT]; accord 
G.T.C., Special Pleadings, 16 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 324, 329 (1837).  “[T]o abolish special 
pleading, and allow the use of no other form of defense than the general issue, must 
operate to produce surprise, uncertainty and want of exactness; thereby defeating the ends 
of justice.”  Special Pleadings, supra, at 329.  A similar view was expressed in England in, 
inter alia, the first article in the first issue of what was for nearly a century one of England’s 
most prestigious law journals.  See Principles and Practices of Pleading, 1 LAW. MAG. 1, 3 
(1828). 
All that we can venture to assume is, the expediency of ascertaining 
beforehand the nature of the matter in dispute, and it is surely too 
obvious for denial, that if the parties were to proceed to trial without 
any warning but a summons to the court, without any species of 
preliminary arrangement, delay, uncertainty, and confusion would 
result. 
Id. 
233 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232, at 150. 
234 Id. 
235 Gould’s Pleading, supra note 226, at 76. 
236 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 103, at 12. 
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unwary.”237  For the harshest critics, it made the science of law into “the 
fruitful mother of the rankest injustice.”238  The “interests of justice” and 
the “voice of the people” demanded nothing less than “radical 
reform.”239 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, much of the legal 
community found common law pleading, even as moderated by 
pleading of the general issue, unsatisfactory.  It was too easy to make a 
misstep:  to go to the wrong court, to choose the wrong form of action, to 
make the wrong plea.  Reformers saw only one way out of the misery:  
“abolish the whole system of special pleading; all actions of law and bills 
in equity.”240  
2. The Growth of Code Pleading 
Change came first through the introduction of “code pleading,” 
named after the Code of Civil Procedure enacted in New York in 1848.241  
The New York Code abandoned the distinction between actions at law 
and suits in equity and created a uniform course of proceeding.242  It 
abolished the forms of action and substituted “one form of 
action . . . denominated a civil action.”243  It likewise abolished “[a]ll the 
forms of pleading heretofore existing” and set its own rules for 
determining the sufficiency of pleadings.244  For example, those rules 
required that the plaintiff serve a document denominated a complaint 
that included, inter alia, “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause 
of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in 
such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know 
what is intended.”245  The Code sought to banish technicalities and rest 
                                                 
237 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232.  The report was authored by later Supreme 
Court Justice, Benjamin R. Curtis.  Curtis dissented in the infamous Dred Scott case. 
238 ROBERT WILLIAM WELLS, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts of Justice 
of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE 
“METROPOLITAN” (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEM. REV. 
477, 482, 486 (1847). 
239 David Dudley Field and fifty members of the New York Bar, The Code of Procedure, 
Memorial to the Legislature (Feb. 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, supra note 73, at 261. 
240 WELLS, supra note 238, at 483. 
241 An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts 
of this State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497 [hereinafter NEW YORK CODE]. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. § 62, at 510. 
244 Id. § 118, at 521. 
245 Id. § 120(2). 
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decisions on substantial rights.246 Pleaders did not have to decide the 
correct legal theory to apply.247 
The promise of common law pleading had been that it would “bring 
the matter of litigation to one or more points, simple and 
unambiguous.”248  This was its contribution to applying law to facts.  
Accordingly, the reform commissions recognized that their codes had to 
accomplish this task if their work was to prove successful.  Some of the 
commissions saw this as a choice of who should frame the issues for 
decision:  a public officer or the parties.249  Should the parties have the 
task, as in special pleading, of reaching the issues, or should they present 
the case to the court “in gross” so that it might “review[ ] the complex 
allegations of both parties and methodis[e] them and evolv[e] the real 
points on which the controversy turns.”250  They regarded the latter as 
characteristic of the civil law and impracticable.  The Massachusetts 
Commission saw borrowing from a foreign system of law as something 
“extremely hazardous and inconvenient.”251  Better, it thought, “to take 
what we now have . . . and amend and build upon it, not in a foreign 
style of architecture or with wholly new materials, but, as far as possible, 
with old materials and after the old fashions . . . .”252 
Code pleading thus retained a law-applying function for the process 
and gave the parties a role in it.  Code pleading anticipated, as had 
common law pleading, that the parties’ pleadings would define the 
issues.253  The device it used to guide law application was the “cause of 
action.”254  The cause of action was an aggregate of operative facts that 
                                                 
246 Id. § 151, at 526. 
247 Charles E. Clark & James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, II.  Pleadings 
and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1301 (1935). 
248 McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 524 (1857). 
249 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232, at 154-55.  For a contemporaneous argument 
in England that reformers should look to how the magistrate in the old Roman law 
prepared the case for decision, see JOHN GEORGE PHILLMORE, THOUGHTS ON LAW REFORM 
AND THE LAW REVIEW, FEBRUARY, 1847, at 11-15 (1847). 
250 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 103, at 10-11.  The Commission chairman used the 
same language in Samuel Tyler, Introduction, in HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 15-16 (Samuel Tyler ed., 3d Am. ed., 2d London 
ed. 1871) (reprinted 1892). 
251 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232, at 159. 
252 Id. 
253 NEW YORK CODE, supra note 241, § 203, at 536.  “Issues arise upon the pleadings . . . .”  
Id. 
254 Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 828 (1924) [hereinafter 
Clark, Code]. 
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gave rise to a legal right enforceable in the courts.255  The idea was that 
the pleading should set out the facts that fulfilled a complete cause of 
action and in so doing would facilitate narrowing the issues.  The 1848 
New York Commissioners thought that the pleadings should “present 
the facts on which the Court is to pronounce the law; to present them in 
such a manner as that the precise points in dispute shall be perceived, to 
which the proofs may be directed.”256  The Massachusetts 
Commissioners proposed that plaintiffs state only the facts on which 
they based their claims and not be required to recite legal conclusions.  
Each party would put the result of his case “upon the facts which he 
states” and would fail if he could not prove them.257  The role of facts in 
pleading led code pleading also to be termed fact pleading. 
Thus code pleading also used syllogistic law application.  While 
code pleading did not require parties to commit to a single legal theory, 
it pushed them to choose specific legal theories.  Without having some 
idea of the legal basis of their claim, parties could not well plead relevant 
facts.  Thus, to the extent that courts were more or less tolerant of 
extraneous material, or more or less tolerant of amendments, the 
pleadings commenced the law application process.  Code pleading did 
not, however, force the parties to a single issue as special pleading had.  
It did not even force them to a limited number of issues.258 
To reach a manageable number of issues the code reformers placed 
hopes in truth and party good will.  Common law pleading had 
compelled parties to rely on fictions and fictitious claims and in effect 
encouraged them to make untrue averments.  The reform codes 
demanded the actual facts.259  To discourage unfounded claims and 
defenses, the parties were to verify on oath the truth of their 
                                                 
255 Id.  Its exact parameters were subject to some debate, particularly with respect to 
whether it included the remedy associated with the right (as the old writs had done).  Id.; 
see also Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1934) [hereinafter Clark, 
Cause].  Many of the commissioners who worked on the civil procedure codes were also 
involved closely in codifying the substantive law in a civil code, which could have worked 
together to effectuate code pleading of causes of action. 
256 FIRST REPORT OF THE PRACTICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848), extensively excerpted in 1 
SPEECHES, supra note 73, at 262, 273 [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]. 
257 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232, at 160. 
258 Cf. McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857) (discussing a case with fifty demurrers 
and exceptions under a code). 
259 E.g., NEW YORK CODE, supra note 241, § 65, at 511 (abolishing “feigned issues”); id. § 
91, at 515 (requiring that actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest).  
The New York Code, in discarding fictions and insisting on a simple statement of facts, was 
seen to substantially approximate civil law pleadings.  Van Santvoord, Study of Law, supra 
note 100, at 32. 
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allegations.260  According to the New York Commissioners, the parties 
would be “better acquainted beforehand with the really disputable 
points, and therefore more able to prepare for and point out to the Court 
and the jury those which are, and those which are not, disputed.”261 
Code reformers did not rely on party good will alone. Advocates of 
code pleading, foremost among them David Dudley Field, were also 
advocates of codification of substantive law. Had they been successful in 
codifying substantive law, the number of possible causes of action might 
have been circumscribed and their content better defined. In the absence 
of codification, pleading remained difficult.262  
Lacking causes of action limited and defined in codes of substantive 
law, code pleading failed to bring litigation down to disputing a few 
precise points.  Lawyers could and did draft pleadings that made out 
causes of action without framing issues for trial; their adversaries had to 
prove a great deal rather than just a few essential issues.263  This failure 
led one New York judge, generations after the introduction of code 
pleading, to advocate the very course that the code comissions had 
consciously avoided:  judicial takeover of issue narrowing.  According to 
this proposal for a “justice factory,” definition of issues should be 
“distinctly a court rather than a partisan proceeding.”264 
                                                 
260 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 232, at 160; NEW YORK CODE, supra note 241, at 
523, § 133. 
261 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 256, at 274; see Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a 
Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 146 (1999).  “Field 
believed that the verification of pleadings would lead to agreement on the truth of 
facts . . . .”  Subrin, supra, at 146. 
262 Cf. G.T. Bispham, Law in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REV. 154, 185-86 (1876). 
Whether the results of this simplification of procedure have been 
altogether desirable, may possibly be doubted. . . . [I]n the method of 
presenting a case for decision by mere statement and answer, there is 
lost that precise and clear definition of the exact points in dispute 
which is found when the technical forms of the pleading of the 
common law are skillfully and carefully applied. . . . [I]t is plain that at 
some stage or other of a judicial proceeding, immaterial and admitted 
facts must be eliminated, otherwise the investigation would become 
hopelessly prolonged and confused . . . 
Id. 
263 Frederick D. Wells, A Justice Factory, JUSTICE THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL PROCEDURE, 
73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 196, 202 (1917). 
264 Id.  Judge Wells imagined a world suggestive of modern continental litigation. 
The court could practically say: “Now on this issue are you seriously 
going to dispute the fact?  As a reasonable man, are you denying it?”  
If he answers “Perhaps it is so, but, let the other side prove it,” it ought 
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Code pleading did not sweep the United States.  Its adoption was 
spotty. Only gradually over a course of decades did it become the 
dominant form of procedure in the American states.  Even after adoption 
of notice pleading in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
common law pleading remained in use.265  Code pleading’s uneven and 
often unsatisfactory adoption was frequently attributed to the resistance 
of courts to abandon common law ways and fairly apply the codes.  The 
Supreme Court itself evidenced considerable hostility when it described 
the code drafters as “sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of 
pleading to order,” who with their experiments managed to “destroy the 
certainty and simplicity of all pleadings, and introduce on the record an 
endless wrangle in writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and 
impeding the administration of justice.”266  
Spotty adoption of the codes led to lack of uniformity.  The federal 
system did not adopt a code and did not merge law and equity 
jurisdictions until 1938.267  In order that actions at law in one state might 
be governed by essentially the same rules, Congress provided in what 
was called the Conformity Act of 1872, that federal practice at law—but 
not at equity—should “conform[ ] as near as may be” to state practice.268  
The Conformity Act, however, hardly lived up to its name and itself led 
to considerable uncertainty.269  
3. Modern Notice Pleading and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Sixty years of experience with code pleading led many American 
lawyers to judge it almost as negatively as their predecessors had judged 
common law pleading.270  A “campaign for modernizing procedure” 
                                                                                                             
to be possible for the court to throw his technical objections out of the 
window. 
Id. 
265 JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969). 
266 Id. at 525. 
267 W.S. SIMKINS, A FEDERAL SUIT AT LAW 3 (1912) (describing the resulting conditions as 
“chaotic”). 
268 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
269 See id. at 7.  When in 1912 the federal courts adopted a set of national rules for equity 
jurisdiction Professor W.S. Simkins asked: “In this uncertainty, may it not be asked why a 
national code of practice cannot be formulated for the law side as well as the equity side of 
the court?”  Id. 
270 Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990 (2003).  
“The cure—code pleading—proved to be as bad as the disease . . . .”  Id.  According to 
Thomas W. Shelton, the campaign’s principal leader through the 1920s as Chairman of the 
American Bar Association’s Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, the courts had 
become “the fencing schools of highly-trained pleaders” where justice was subordinated to 
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began with the first Interstate Conference of Judges in 1912 and 
eventually led to introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938.271 Professor Stephen N. Subrin sees in adoption of the Federal 
Rules the triumph of equity over common law procedure.272 
The Federal Rules made a major change in pleading:  they essentially 
eliminated a role for it in formulating issues, and thereby largely 
eliminated application of the law at that stage.  Charles E. Clark, the 
principal drafter of the Federal Rules, believed that the procedure codes 
had successfully abolished the forms of action and the separation of law 
and equity, but had failed in their attempt to substitute fact pleading for 
common law issue pleading.273  The reformers had not appreciated, he 
argued, that the difference between law and fact is one of degree.274  A 
pleader often could not know his or her legal theory before the evidence 
was produced and, if he or she did, would not want to give the theory 
away.275  The code concept of cause of action, Clark claimed, had a “long, 
inglorious, and destructive career,” and had “done more damage than 
ever the forms of action could possibly do.”276  Clark advocated that one 
should “expect less” of pleading.277  He proposed abandoning both issue 
pleading of the common law and fact pleading of the codes and 
advocated adoption of “notice pleading.”   
                                                                                                             
technicality.  Thomas W. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 1 VA. L. REV. 89, 90 (1913) 
[hereinafter Shelton, Reform].  Shelton focused on adoption of legislation to enable the 
Supreme Court to adopt rules of court.  Id. at 97.  The problem with procedure of the day, 
he felt, was exclusive legislative control in the form of “rigid, uncompromising statutes, or 
by the ancient common law made over by statutes.”  Id.; see also THOMAS W. SHELTON, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE COURTS [iii-dedication], passim (1918) [hereinafter SHELTON, SPIRIT] (tying his 
campaign to the movement for uniform legislation discussed below). 
271 See generally SHELTON, SPIRIT, supra note 270; Thomas W. Shelton, Campaign for 
Modernizing Procedure, 7 A.B.A. J. 165 (1921).  The campaign followed Roscoe Pound’s 
celebrated 1906 address to the American Bar Association.  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964); see 
Charles E. Clark & James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, I. The Background, 
44 YALE L.J. 387, 388 (1935). 
272 Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 224. 
273 Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 544 
(1925) [hereinafter Clark, History]. 
274 Id. at 533-34. 
275 Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 260 (1926) 
[hereinafter Clark, Complaint]. 
276 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 312 (1938) [hereinafter 
Clark, Handmaid]. 
277 See Clark, History, supra note 273, at 542. 
Maxeiner: Legal Indeterminancy Made in America:  U.S. Legal Methods and the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
568 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
As a result, the Federal Rules utilize notice pleading, and they 
“massively deemphasize[ ]” the role of pleadings.278  In a notice pleading 
system, the pleading tells the other side the general subject of the 
controversy and little more; in fact, the Federal Rules require only “a 
short and plain statement of the claim.”279  The official forms make 
explicit how little is required.  For example, a complaint for goods sold 
and delivered is sufficient if it states “Defendant owes plaintiff _____ 
dollars for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between 
June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.”280  Unlike common law pleading, 
the Federal Rules do not require that parties choose a legal theory.281  
Unlike code pleading, they do not require that parties plead all the 
elements of a cause of action.282  The Federal Rules do not normally 
require that parties even state the facts that support the claims they 
make.283   
Since most state systems have adopted the Federal Rules outright or 
have emulated them in most respects, application of law through 
pleadings has largely vanished.  Clark saw reduction in the role of 
pleading as a step toward the continental civil law, where “little is 
expected of pleading.”284  In the liberal attitude toward pleading, Clark 
observed, “We tend towards the civil law system; we shall probably not 
reach it for many generations, if at all.”285  Because the civil law system 
treats ascertaining of issues as part of the process itself, it does not give 
great importance to pleading.  Clarke contended that “the continental 
system has the great advantage over our own of avoiding in the main all 
the extensive litigation over pleading and procedural points which is 
such a reproach to our system of justice.”286  By stripping away the law-
applying function of pleadings, the Federal Rules were to assure litigants 
their day in court.287 Many decades later, however, American civil 
                                                 
278 Fairman, supra note 270, at 990. 
279 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
280 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5. 
281 Fairman, supra note 270, at 1001. 
282 See Swierkiewics v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Bennett v. Schmit, 153 F.3d 
516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998); Fairman, supra note 270, at 1001 n.95 (citing Strong v. David, 297 
F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
283 Subrin & Main, supra note 222, at 1991; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (stating that pleading 
requirements for fraud or mistake are higher than mere notice: these claims must be stated 
with “particularity”).  But see Fairman, supra note 266, at 1064 (questioning, but then 
essentially affirming the predominance of notice pleading). 
284 Clark, History, supra note 273, at 542. 
285 Id. at 543. 
286 Id. at 525. 
287 See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 276, at 318-19; Fairman, supra note 270, at 990. 
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procedure is as far from continental procedure as ever:  it is just that now 
it is distant in a different direction. While American procedure 
abandoned common law forms as a means of law-applying, it did not 
adopt civil law-applying either.  
D. Law-applying Post Pleading 
If pleading has lost its law-applying function, when in this new 
modern procedure are law and fact to come together?288  They do not, 
according to Professor Subrin, who caustically concludes that in today’s 
“equity-dominated system . . . the highest goal is for courts not to apply 
law to facts.”289  The drafters of the Federal Rules, of course, hoped that 
law would be applied. They saw litigation as a two-stage process:  “In 
the first stage the points of dispute are ascertained and defined; in the 
second they are tried and determined.”290  Today Americans speak of 
pretrial, which is common, and trial, which is rare.  Pretrial includes the 
discovery phase and possible motions for summary judgment to avoid 
trial.  Trial includes trial by court or jury and associated motions for 
directed verdicts, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for new 
trials.   
1. Pretrial Procedures 
a. Discovery 
Just as their code reformer predecessors had, the drafters put a great 
deal of faith in the power of truth.  According to Professor Edson R. 
Sunderland, Clark’s partner in drafting the Federal Rules and the one 
responsible for pretrial, the great weakness of pleading for developing 
issues of fact for trial was its “total lack of any machinery for testing the 
factual basis for the pleaders’ allegations and denials.”291  Discovery is a 
means for the parties, prior to trial, to learn the substance of each other’s 
cases.  The theory is that once both sides know the full truth, they can 
either settle the case themselves, or can at least agree on which issues are 
material to decision.  Should the parties be unwilling to agree, where 
there is no reasonable dispute about the facts, the court may determine 
those claims upon motion for summary judgment.  According to the 
Supreme Court, the system “relies on liberal discovery rules and 
                                                 
288 Cf. Subrin & Main, supra note 222, at 1993.  “So, when, in this brave new procedural 
world, would the diagnosis function of civil procedure take place?  Or, put another way, 
when would the parties integrate law and fact to advocate and persuade?”  Id. 
289 Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 224, at 989. 
290 Edson R. Sunderland, The Function of Pre-Trial Procedure, 6 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1 (1939). 
291 Id. 
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summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 
dispose of unmeritorious claims.”292   
Discovery is allowed of any matter “relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense 
of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or the claim or defense of 
any other party.”293  It is sufficient that the information or materials 
sought “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”294  Discovery largely works through the parties.  In 
most cases, judicial involvement is limited to directing one or more pre-
trial conferences that determine schedules and decide claims of privilege.  
As there is little judicial involvement, discovery can define issues only to 
the extent that the parties are willing to agree.  Dean John S. Beckerman 
identifies as one of discovery’s fatal flaws “conflicts between discovery’s 
cooperative ideal and the rest of adversarial litigation’s aggressively 
partisan ethic.”295  That the permissive nature of discovery leads to delay 
and to the “disadvantage of justice” is widely acknowledged.296   
b. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is a way to avoid trial after or even in the course 
of discovery.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) permits parties to 
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  The other side 
defeats the motion by showing that there is a “genuine issue of material 
fact.”  Summary judgment, reformers hoped, would make the system 
“efficient” by clearing out baseless claims.297  Their hopes were overly 
optimistic.  The practical problem that summary judgment confronts is 
the high bar it sets.  Nothing compels litigants to admit points, so that to 
establish that there is no “genuine issue of material fact” can be hard to 
do.  Before the mid-1980s, it was almost impossible.298  In the mid-1980s 
the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases that taken together are seen 
                                                 
292 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
294 Id. 
295 John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 585 
(2000). 
296 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (advisory comm.’s note to 1983 amend.). 
297 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of 
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 98-99 
(1988).  Reformers saw summary judgment as a device to reach “speedy disposition of 
many cases” where there was “no real cause of action or defense.”  Clark, History, supra 
note 273, at 536; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (advisory comm.’s note to original rule). 
298 Subrin & Main, supra note 222, at 1993-2004. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/1
2006] Legal Indeterminacy Made in America 571 
to invigorate the procedure.299  But even as reinvigorated, summary 
judgment can only deal with claims largely lacking in merit and cannot 
deal with claims requiring complex application of law to facts.300  That 
the American system, as a general rule, does not shift attorney costs to 
the losing party renders the motion for summary judgment less than 
complete solace for the law-abiding.  Just as settling parties do not 
recover litigation costs, likewise parties victorious after summary 
judgment do not either.  Yet summary judgment ordinarily presupposes 
some level of discovery.  It requires a motion practice.  Thus, even a law-
abiding party who is lucky enough to win a motion for summary 
judgment still loses.   
2. Trial Procedures 
The jury model dominates law-applying by civil judicial process.  
There can be no bench trial if the parties do not waive jury trial.  There 
can be no summary judgment if there are facts for the jury to determine.  
Where special verdicts are used, juries still decide facts.  Even when 
parties apply the law to themselves by settling cases, they do so based on 
their beliefs as to what juries would decide.   
a. Ordinary Jury Verdicts 
Jurors are supposed to decide according to law, but the American 
legal system gives them no training in legal decision-making.  Indeed, it 
gives them only the most rudimentary of assistance.  Judges are 
responsible for instructing jurors in individual trials.  Usually this means 
no more than that at the end of the parties’ presentations of their cases, 
the judges orally state what the law is.301  They admonish the jurors that 
it is their duty to apply the law as given by the judge to the facts the 
jurors find.302  They no longer, as they once did, comment on the 
evidence produced at trial.303  Judges, in complicated cases, give detailed 
and lengthy instructions in the law that lead to what one judge called 
“[p]olysyllabic mystification.”304  Instructing juries is not interactive;305 
                                                 
299 Miller, supra note 205, at 1041.  The trilogy of cases regarding summary judgment 
were Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
300 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). 
301 The usual model is described here. There are variations among states and courts. 
302 E.g., Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil 3.1 (2006), http://www.lb5. 
uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/. 
303 See Renée Letton Lerner, The Transformation of the America Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195 (2000). 
304 Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 899 (1993). 
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judges read instructions and juries listen.  Should juries have questions 
during the course of their deliberations, they can submit these to the 
judges.  Typically judges read back what they read originally.306  
Proposals to improve jury application of law to facts have been modest.  
Even minor measures, such as giving juries printed copies of the judge’s 
instructions, instructing juries at the beginning rather than the end of the 
testimony, and allowing the jurors to take notes during the trial, 
encounter opposition.   
Ordinarily, juries return what are called general verdicts, i.e., 
decisions without reasoned statements of the grounds for decision.  
“[G]eneral verdict[s] [are] as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as 
the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi.”307  
Lacking written justifications, judges or parties might quiz the jurors 
about their verdicts to determine if the jurors followed the law correctly, 
but they are not allowed to do so.  In order to protect jury independence, 
there is a “presumption that jurors . . . follow their instructions.”308   
Judges are able to exercise only the most limited control of general 
verdicts.  Since general verdicts lack reasoned explanations, there is no 
way for judges to know whether jurors applied the rules of law 
correctly.309  Trial judges, who witness the testimony, may decide cases 
contrary to the jury’s decision if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”310  This 
                                                                                                             
305 See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: 
How the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542, 
675-77 (1990) (explaining how the European idea that judges might deliberate together with 
jurors is thought to be practically inconceivable).  A proposal in a draft of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence to adopt the English practice of the judge commenting on the evidence was 
quickly shot down as “highly controversial.”  See also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary 
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 429 (1992); Laura Braden 
Foster, Comment, Nobles v. Casebier and Judicial Comments on the Evidence in Arkansas, 51 
ARK. L. REV. 801, 814 n.102 (1998). 
306 Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury 
Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1086 (2001). 
307 Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920).  Judge 
Jerome Frank used similar words in Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 
1948). 
308 Gacy, 994 F.2d at 313; Kimball R. Anderson & Bruce R. Braun, The Legal Legacy of John 
Wayne Gacy: The Irrebuttable Presumption that Juries Understand and Follow Jury Instructions, 
78 MARQ. L. REV. 791, 797-98 (1995). 
309 Cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1865 (1998).  “The ability to disclose a decision without having to 
formally justify it is itself a kind of power, rather like the parents’ ‘because I said so.’”  Id. 
310 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1); see Miller, supra note 205, at 1057-58.  In some state courts, the 
judge may grant such a motion only if there is no “scintilla” of evidence supporting the 
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control is weak; competent lawyers can ordinarily produce enough 
evidence to avoid judgment as a matter of law.311  In other circumstances, 
trial judges may order new trials.312  Control is similarly limited on 
appeal.  Appellate courts are able to control only whether verdicts are 
completely unsupported and not whether the verdicts are correct.313  But 
they can only review the record to see if there is some evidence on which 
a jury might have based its decision.  They cannot themselves take 
testimony.  In any case, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution 
prohibits their reexamination of most jury findings of fact.   
b. Special Jury Verdicts  
In the era of special pleading, as has been seen, the normal jury 
verdict was “special”—that is, the jury found a specific fact.  That finding 
determined the outcome of the entire controversy.  It was the general 
verdict—where the jury found all the facts in dispute and applied the 
law to those facts—that was exceptional.  Special verdicts survived 
abolition of special pleading.314  Today proponents recommend greater 
use of special verdicts in order to improve rationality of jury trials and to 
restore law-applying to judges as much as possible.315  When judges use 
special verdicts, they instruct juries to make a “special written finding 
upon each issue of fact”; the judges then enter judgment based on the 
facts found.316  Ordinarily they submit a series of questions.  Judges have 
complete discretion whether to use special verdicts.317  Special verdicts 
                                                                                                             
opposing side’s case.  Miller, supra note 205, at 1057-58.  Judges do not have to wait for the 
jury’s decision.  Id.  On motion, where there is no evidence for one side, they may grant a 
directed verdict for the other side.  Id. 
311 ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 29 (1999). 
312 Albert D. Brault & John A. Lynch, Jr., The Motion for New Trial and Its Constitutional 
Tension, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 39 (1998).  These circumstances include jury verdicts that are 
against the weight of the evidence.  Id.  But judges may not set aside verdicts on 
evidentiary grounds simply because they would have decided the cases differently.  Id. at 
40. 
313 Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE 
L.J. 480, 515 (1975). 
314 Judge Seymour Thompson devoted a full chapter to the topic in his noted guide to 
trials.  2 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 2006-19 (1889). 
315 See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 189, at 21. 
316 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a) (strangely stating the judge’s role only by implication). 
317 Thornburg, supra note 309, at 1840; cf. Brief for Petitioner at 17-23, Libbey-Owens-Ford 
Co. v. Shatterproofglass Corp., No. 85-635 (Oct. 12, 1985) (arguing that due process requires 
fact questions in complex patent cases to be determined by special verdicts). 
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largely take the law-applying function away from juries; consequently, 
they are anathema to proponents of an extra-legal function for juries.318   
Jury interrogatories are a device similar to special verdicts.  Here, 
judges submit to juries, along with forms for a general verdict, “written 
interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is 
necessary to a verdict.”319  If the jury returns answers to the 
interrogatories that are consistent with each other, and with the general 
verdict, the judge then enters judgment on that verdict.  If, however, the 
jury returns answers that are inconsistent with the general verdict, the 
judge may enter judgment consistent with the answers, may return the 
case for further consideration by the jury, or may order a new trial.  If the 
answers are inconsistent with each other, the judge may not enter a 
judgment, but must either return the case to the jury for further 
deliberation or order a new trial.320   
Special verdicts and written jury interrogatories are obvious 
approaches to making jury verdicts more consistent with law and to deal 
with complex cases that jurors may have difficulty comprehending.321  
Indeed, the drafters of the New York Code of 1848 recommended both 
devices “where the questions may be complicated.”  The Commission 
thought that use of a “special verdict in writing, upon all or any of the 
issues[,]” or “a general verdict [found] upon particular questions of fact, 
stated in writing,” would tend “to give greater precision to the language 
of the Judge, enable the jury the better to separate the questions, and 
prevent mistake and misunderstanding.”322  But use of special verdicts 
and written interrogatories is occasional rather than routine.  This may 
be because judges feel that they intrude on the prerogative of the jury.  It 
may, however, be because writing special verdicts and interrogatories is 
difficult.  Applying law to even simple disputes quickly devolves into 
complex decision trees, where determination of relevant questions 
depends on answers to previous ones.   
                                                 
318 E.g., Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting 
Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505 (1995). 
319 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b). 
320 Id. 
321 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (arguing 
that complex cases required eliminating use of juries). 
322 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 256, at 273-74. 
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c. Bench Trials 
While jury trials are preferred, many trials are by judge alone 
without jury.323  Here law application is more oriented toward syllogistic 
law application.  Judges are required to “find the facts specially and state 
separately . . . conclusions of law.”324  While normally judges do this in 
writing, they can state these in court orally and file them as recorded.325  
There is surprisingly little literature on how they should write their 
judgments.  Compared to the mountains of German literature on the 
subject, there seems to be only one substantial American book.326  Why 
this difference?  Training for judging plays no role in American legal 
education and only a tiny role in a newly appointed judge’s.   
Even if decisions were all according to law and all those laws were 
well-drafted and easily found, the American legal system would still 
have unnecessary legal indeterminacy. The peculiar form of American 
federalism sees to that, as Part VI reveals. 
VI.  RULE CONFLICTS AND RULE COORDINATION 
The rule of law promises that rules do not conflict with each other.  
No one can comply with two contradictory rules.  Where rule conflicts 
originate with the same lawmaker, there is a failure of lawmaking.  
Where conflicts originate with different lawmakers, there is a failure of 
coordination.327  Rule conflicts due to failed coordination are rife in 
America and particularly pointless.   
Rule conflicts due to failed coordination are intensely important for 
practice.  The usual first step in self-application of law is to determine 
which jurisdiction’s rules apply.  Uncertainty as to which rules apply 
and conflicts among them often contribute more to indeterminacy than 
doubts about what the rules themselves mean.  People need to know 
which rules to abide by.   
                                                 
323 The parties may have no right to a jury trial (e.g., for an equitable claim) or they may 
waive their rights. 
324 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see Clark & Moore, supra note 247, at 411-13 (noting that the bench 
trial where the judge finds issues of fact without a jury is a statutory innovation of the 
nineteenth century). 
325 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).  There is no such requirement for determination of motions to 
dismiss under Rule 12 or for summary judgment under Rule 56.  Id. 
326 JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK (4th ed. 2000); see also FED. 
JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL (1991) (a slim forty-one page pamphlet, portions of 
which are devoted to topics of ordinary writing). 
327 See generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986). 
Maxeiner: Legal Indeterminancy Made in America:  U.S. Legal Methods and the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
576 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
The law of conflicts of law deals with one kind of rules conflict:  
where two different jurisdictions at the same level prescribe different 
rules for the same transaction, conflicts law chooses one rule to apply.  
For example, conflicts law determines which law applies when A, who 
resides in forum F1, buys goods from B, who maintains a business in 
forum F2.  Here these are called horizontal conflicts.  A well-functioning 
conflicts law improves legal determinacy and helps fulfill the guidance 
function of the rule of law.  American conflicts laws are notorious for 
their uncertainty.328   
Conflicts laws do not address two important situations of rule 
conflicts:  horizontal harmony and vertical consistency.  At the 
horizontal level, when different rules regulate similar but separate 
conduct in different jurisdictions, in theory there is no conflict because the 
different rules do not require contradictory conduct.  But for parties 
active in both jurisdictions, such different rules in practice undercut the 
guidance function of the rule of law, since those subject to the different 
rules may not practically be able to adjust their conduct to local 
differences.  They reasonably wish for rules in harmony with each other.  
Vertical rule conflicts arise when two (or more) governments, which are 
related one to the other in a vertical relationship, each have authority 
over the same jurisdiction and issue contradictory commands (e.g., 
state/federal, local/state).   
Parties active in multiple jurisdictions complain when those 
jurisdictions prescribe inconsistent conduct. Yet American judges have 
grown so used to failed coordination between federal and state 
governments, among the state governments, and between state and local 
governments, that they have come to accept the resulting indeterminacy 
as a necessary evil, “the price we pay for our federalism.”329  Such 
indeterminacy is indefensible.  American governments could coordinate 
their laws without imposing the costs of indeterminacy on those subject 
to them.   
                                                 
328 See Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J. 527, 527 (2000) 
(referring to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law as a “blend of indeterminate 
indeterminacy” and a “total disaster in practice”).  They do bring a certain amount of 
determinacy to contract law through the principle of party autonomy that permits parties 
to choose the applicable law. 
329 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958). 
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A. Federal-State Coordination 
The Constitution of the United States of America was path-breaking.  
It creates a federal government of limited powers and sets out what 
those powers are.  It prescribes that where the federal government has 
legislative power, federal law is supreme.330  It provides that powers not 
delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states.331  In a 
few instances, it prohibits states from certain conduct.332  In its original 
form, since altered by the Seventeenth Amendment, it provided state 
governments a role in federal lawmaking by bestowing on state 
legislatures the power to appoint senators in Congress.333  But beyond 
these limited measures, it says little about how state and federal 
governments are to coordinate their laws.   
Federal constitutions of more recent origin, written in light of 
American experiences, are less laconic.334  They do more to facilitate 
federal-state coordination.  They include catalogs of competencies setting 
out which are exclusive to the federal government335 and which are 
shared (concurrent) with state governments.336  Also, they set out what 
these competencies mean and how they are to be implemented.337  They 
give state governments a direct role in the making of federal laws.338  As 
a result, they can create uniformity of national law while providing that 
the states are to administer it.339  By taking a proactive role in inter-
governmental relations, they can reduce indeterminacy.   
                                                 
330 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
331 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
332 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
333 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
334 Schauer, Failure, supra note 98, at 766.  While it has fewer than 5,000 words, its German 
counterpart has more than 20,000.  Id. 
335 E.g., Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C 310/12-13 art. I-13 (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter DRAFT EU CONST.]; Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23, 1949, as amended to Sept. 28, 2006, art. 73 
[hereinafter GG (for the German designation, Grundgesetz)]. 
336 E.g., DRAFT EU CONST. arts. I-14, I-17; GG arts. 74. 
337 E.g., DRAFT EU CONST. arts. I-11, I-12; GG arts. 70-72. 
338 E.g., DRAFT EU CONST. arts. I-34, III-396; GG arts. 50, 77. 
339 E.g., GG art 84.  Justice Story hoped for something similar for the United States, 
stating 
it is altogether desirable that, in states which are only minor divisions 
of one nation, having the same religion, manners and cultivation, the 
municipal laws, and the institutions for their administration, should, 
as far as possible, be made common to the whole, although matters of 
political administration might be kept distinct. 
Story, Law, supra note 79 (MCCLELLAN, Appendix III, at 356). 
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1. Judicial Review 
Early in the history of the United States, the Supreme Court stepped 
into the void left by the terse Constitution.  Through the mechanism of 
judicial review the Court sought to distinguish legislative powers that 
are exclusive to the federal government from those that are concurrent 
with the states.340  It tried to craft a method for coordinating state and 
federal legislation.  Its chosen method of judicial review measures both 
state and federal legislation for compliance with the Constitution’s 
allocation of legislative powers.341  Federal legislation must be based on a 
power enumerated in the Constitution; state legislation must not be 
preempted by federal legislation or by an unexercised grant of legislative 
power of the federal government.   
Judicial review has tried to demark exclusive and concurrent 
competencies of federal and state governments.  The task of drawing 
clear lines has proven impossible to achieve.  In the very case where the 
Supreme Court first attempted to measure state statutes against federal 
legislative power, Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice Johnson presciently warned 
that the competing powers “meet and blend so as scarcely to admit of 
separation.”342  Many scholars believe that workable judicial rules of 
decision have not and cannot be attained.343  The Court’s decisions suffer 
from a lack of political legitimacy:  how legislative competencies should 
be shared among federal and state governments is quintessentially a 
political question subject always to be revisited over time.   
Uncertainty in precise allocation of legislative competencies between 
federal and state government need not endanger the guidance function 
of the rule of law so long as the division of competencies is settled before 
application of the law.  When complying with law, people are indifferent 
as to whose law they are complying with.  But the American legal system 
does not give such legal determinacy.  It decides questions of legislative 
competency, not before, but as the legal rule is applied, and therefore at 
the risk and expense of those trying to comply with it.  It treats the issue 
of legislative competency as an element of a party’s case.   
                                                 
340 Judicial review is not limited to review of legislative competencies, but is a general 
review of consistency with the Constitution. 
341 Cf. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) 
(noting that most “of federalism” is not founded in the “spare text” of the Constitution, but 
in subsequent judicial development). 
342 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1824). 
343 Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First 
Principles To Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social 
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). 
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There is no judicial review of legislation before it takes effect;344 
instead, judicial review requires a case or controversy arising after a law 
is in force.345  The case or controversy doctrine allows courts to 
determine whether a federal or state law complies with the Constitution 
only when the law is applied in a way that impacts a particular person.  
The doctrine precludes what are called advisory opinions.  The Supreme 
Court presents the case or controversy doctrine as a way to reduce the 
frequency of challenges to legislation and as its deference to 
legislation.346  But the effect is just the opposite:  delayed decisions 
complicate abiding by law.  Until overturned, laws are presumptively 
valid and the law-abiding must comply with them if they can.347   
While other legal systems, with an eye to American experiences, 
have adopted the substance of American judicial review, few have 
adopted the American method.  Foreign systems typically use “abstract” 
review of legislation, which American usage would consider 
impermissible advisory opinions.348  Abstract review authorizes 
designated interested parties (e.g., governments, legislators) to challenge 
legislation before it takes effect,349 and can make unnecessary 
consideration of issues such as federal preemption in ordinary 
lawsuits.350   
American-style judicial review diminishes legal determinacy in other 
ways.  By treating constitutional review as a matter to be raised 
exclusively in party litigation, it delays and confounds determination of 
constitutional questions.  Parties must raise constitutional questions in 
ordinary courts at the lowest level, where the constitutional issues may 
be avoided.  Even when constitutional issues are addressed in the lower 
                                                 
344 See already the criticism of Simon Stern in 1879, quoted supra note 84. 
345 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61 (1986); see STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: 
THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997) (containing scholars questioning whether 
there is a basis in the early practice of American courts for the strong antagonism to 
advisory opinions). 
346 Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1003 (1924). 
347 See generally WILLIAM GREENE, SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF A FREE 
GOVERNMENT 32 (1851). 
348 See generally Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why 
It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744 (2003). 
349 E.g., GG art. 93, para. 1, § 2 (German provision allowing the federal government, a 
state government, or one third of the members of the lower chamber of parliament, to bring 
a challenge). 
350 See ALEXANDER KONZELMANN, METHODE LANDESRECHTLICHER RECHTSBEREINIGUNG 
n.542, n.544 (1997); WOLFGANG MÄRZ, BUNDESRECHT BRICHT LANDESRECHT 108-12, 204 
(1989) (both noting that GG art. 31 is largely superfluous when the competency rules of GG 
Arts. 70 et seq. are followed); HANS SCHNEIDER, GESETZGEBUNG  (3d ed. 2002). 
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courts, appeals may end short of the Supreme Court.  When that occurs, 
a law may be upheld in one jurisdiction, but struck down in another.  
This long and expensive process is destructive of determinacy.351  While 
it is ongoing, people must abide by the law as written.  Since many 
judges have authority to invalidate laws, and the Supreme Court can 
decide only a few cases each year, “rogue” judges can “get away” with 
interpretations that the high court would not accept.352   
2. Competing Bureaucracies 
Another distinctive feature of American federalism is that it 
establishes, parallel to state courts and administrative agencies, separate 
federal courts and administrative agencies.353  The Constitution does not 
require such parallel structures; while it establishes one Supreme Court, 
it merely authorizes Congress to create lower federal courts.354  James 
Madison would have liked the Constitution to mandate lower courts, but 
had to settle for what is called the “Madisonian compromise.”355  This 
system of dual competencies complicates coordination and causes “a 
tremendous waste of judicial and private resources.”356  This waste is 
accepted, with resignation, as a necessary evil.357   
B. State-to-State Rule Coordination 
Differences in laws among the states are a major source of legal 
indeterminacy in modern America.  While the indeterminacy is real, the 
differences in substantive law generally are not.  They are often only 
differences in details.  With the abolition of slavery, at the latest, the 
                                                 
351 This was noted long ago. See, e.g., Henry Reed, Some Late Efforts at Constitutional 
Reform, 121 N. AM. REV. 1, 20 (1875) (“The universal uncertainty inevitably prevailing in the 
interval between the passage of a law of doubtful constitutionality and the final 
adjudication upon it is an evil important enough to be noticed.”). 
352 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 253-54. Congress addressed the concentration issue in the 
Three Judge Court Act of 1910, which was repealed in 1976.  Tamara Hall, The Hyde Bill: An 
Attempt To Resurrect the 1910 Three-Judge Court Act, CT. REV., Spring 1998, at 32-33. 
353 Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1293, 1294 (2003); Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and 
the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 410 (2003). 
354 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 
355 Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of 
the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1461 (1989).  Madison argued that “Confidence 
cannot be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests.” 
Id.; see also Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39 (1995). 
356 Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996). 
357 Id. at 249; accord Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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United States rejected the idea that different states might have 
fundamentally different social, economic, or political systems.   
The importance of differences among state rules as a cause of legal 
indeterminacy has increased over time and is directly related to the 
growth of commerce in the nineteenth century.  When the Constitution 
was adopted in 1789, coordination of the laws of the several states was 
not a major issue.358  Travel in 1789 was rare;359 interstate commerce was 
insignificant.360  But within a century, all that had changed and 
merchants carried on trade in every state.361  The effect of this revolution 
in commerce on the legal system was a common topic in legal 
literature.362   
In the first half of the nineteenth century the issue of state-to-state 
rule coordination was nascent.  It was overshadowed by the overriding 
question of slavery.363  Justice Story worried that the nation legally was 
“perpetually receding farther and farther from the common standard.”364  
He sought coordination through a preeminent role for federal law and 
through an efficient choice of law system.  He authored important court 
decisions enhancing the status of federal law,365 commentaries that might 
form the basis of uniform law,366 and the first book ever in English on 
                                                 
358 Maintaining two separate societies—one slave and one free—was. 
359 Leonard A. Jones, Uniformity of Laws Through National and Interstate Codification, in 
REPORT OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 157, 157-
59 (1894), reprinted in 28 AM. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1894) (noting that in 1789 it took nearly a 
week to travel between Boston and New York, the two leading commercial centers of the 
day). 
360 Edward A. Moseley, Interstate Commerce, in 1 1795-1895: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN COMMERCE 25, 30 (Chauncey M. DePew ed., 1895). 
361 Jones, supra note 359. 
362 See, e.g., Note, 17 AM. L. REV. 789, 789 (1883).  “When our constitution was framed, the 
steamboat, the railway, and the magnetic telegraph were not dreamed of.”  Id. 
363 Cf. The Proper Limits Between State and National Legislation and Jurisdiction, 15 AM. L. 
REV. 193, 194 (1867) [hereinafter The Proper Limits].  Code-oriented law reformers 
concentrated on laws within a single state rather than on harmonizing laws among several 
states.  They assumed that successful efforts in one state would be copied in other states.  
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 26 (1977) (Montana, California, and the 
Dakota Territory did adopt all five of the codes that David Dudley Field prepared for New 
York). 
364 Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence, An Address Delivered Before the Members of 
the Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, at Boston (Sept. 4, 1821), in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 213, 224 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
365 See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (federal common law to govern diversity 
cases); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (applying admiralty 
jurisdiction to navigable inland waterways).  See generally TONY ALLAN FREYER, HARMONY 
& DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981). 
366 GILMORE, supra note 363, at 27-28. 
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conflicts of law.367  He thought it “hopeless to expect that any greater 
uniformity [would] exist in the future.”368   
With the end of slavery and of the Civil War, the issue of state-to-
state rule coordination burst on the legal scene with vigor and 
urgency.369  For a quarter-century the need for uniformity of law was a 
major issue in legal circles.370  Hannis Taylor succinctly stated the 
generally-felt need for national uniformity in wide areas of law:   
[A]s the country has grown older, the people of the 
United States as a whole—in their personal relations—
have become far more united and harmonious than have 
the various systems of State law by which their 
commercial and domestic interests are largely governed.  
For this reason the constant conflict of law which daily 
arises in the affairs of our national life, with its 
consequent uncertainties, is becoming an evil so serious 
that it must soon pass from the hands of the theorist to 
those of the practical statesman.371   
While there was little opposition to greater uniformity of law, there was 
considerable discussion as to how best to achieve that goal within the 
federal system.  Should the federal government impose uniform law?372  
                                                 
367 See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC (1834). 
368 But see, e.g., FREYER, supra note 365, at 20 (citing JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF 
LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 353 (1801)); John William Wallace, The Want of Uniformity 
in the Commercial Law Between the Different States of Our Union: A Discourse Delivered 
Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia (Nov. 26, 1851) (calling for uniform rules). 
369 See, e.g., The Proper Limits, supra note 363. 
370 A few examples are, EDWIN JOHN JAMES, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
1867, at 8 (1867) (national bankruptcy act of 1867 relied on specific constitutional grant in 
Article I, section 8, “to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout 
the United States”); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CALL FOR A CONFERENCE; PROCEEDINGS 
OF CONFERENCE, FIRST MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION, OFFICERS, MEMBERS, ETC. 16 (1878) 
(Article I of the first American Bar Association Constitution in 1878 made “uniformity of 
legislation throughout the Union” a first purpose of the Association); Note, 17 AM. L. REV. 
789, 789 (1883) (commenting: “scarcely an anniversary bar meeting takes place without 
suggestions being put forth in favor of uniformity or unification throughout the whole 
country in some department of the law”). 
371 HANNIS TAYLOR, AN INTER-STATE CODE COMMISSION (1881), reprinted in REPORT OF 
THE ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE 
ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 210 (1882). 
372 Many argued that it already had sufficient authority.  See, e.g., George Merrill, An 
American Civil Code, 14 AM. L. REV. 652 (1880) (contending that if the federal government 
made full use of existing powers, it could enact laws that states would copy); Nathaniel A. 
Prentiss, Unification of the Law, 16 AM. L. REV. 307, 317 (1882); William Reynolds, A National 
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Or should the states voluntarily adopt uniform laws?373  Many variations 
were discussed.374 
At the close of the nineteenth century, the United States tried both 
approaches.  The federal government adopted the Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887 and the Sherman [Antitrust] Act of 1890.  Several states in 
1892 founded the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform 
State Law and charged it with drafting laws that they might voluntarily 
adopt in fields such as divorce and commercial law.  This approach was 
consciously mixed:  preferably, uniform legislation by voluntary state 
action, but where necessary, federal legislation without constitutional 
amendment, if federal powers were sufficient.375  The optimism of the 
founders of the National Conference was palpable; its first report 
asserted:  “It is probably not too much to say that this is the most 
important juristic work undertaken in the United States since the 
adoption of the Federal [C]onstitution.”376  Thirty years later, the 
founders of the American Law Institute were no less optimistic.  Its 
founders compared their task to that faced by the lawyers of Justinian’s 
day who “produced the codification and exposition of that law which 
has been the main foundation of all the law of the civilized world except 
                                                                                                             
Codification of the Law of Evidence, 16 AM. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1882); Seymour D. Thompson, 
Abuses of Corporate Privileges, 26 AM. L. REV. 169, 196-97 (1892); Note, 18 AM. L. REV. 868 
(1884). 
373 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SNYDER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARRIAGE OR LEGAL PERPLEXITIES OF 
WEDLOCK IN THE UNITED STATES chs. xx-xxi (1889) (arguing that ways should be found to 
encourage the states to adopt uniform legislation and proposing a “prohibitory 
amendment” to encourage states to adopt uniform laws, e.g., prohibiting state laws from 
outlawing divorce); Peter Winship, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the International Unification of Private Law, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 227, 232 (1993) 
(citing and quoting 1903 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 29) (remarks of Amasa M. Eaton). 
374 In addition to the sources cited in the two previous footnores, see Note, 17 AM. L. REV. 
768, 768 (1883) (arguing that the Constitution should be amended to empower Congress to 
enact broader legislation). 
375 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, excerpted in 25 
AM. L. REV. 832, 834 (1891); Elbert C. Ferguson, The Necessity of Uniform Legislation, 4 AM. 
LAWYER 492, 493 (1896); Francis B. James, Commercial Aspect of Uniform State Laws, 5 MICH. 
L. REV. 509, 509-11 (1907); F. J. Stimson, National Unification of Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 92, 92 
(1894). 
376 Jones, supra note 359, at 169, reprinted in 28 AM. L. REV. 547, 557 (1894).  Stimson’s 
enthusiasm was common. See, e.g., Alton B. Parker, Uniform State Laws, 19 YALE L.J. 401 
(1910); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 192 (“as great an opportunity as has 
fallen to jurists of any age”); Walter George Smith, The Progress of Uniform Legislation, 1911-
12, 24 GREEN BAG 457, 465 (1912) (President’s Address delivered at the 22nd annual 
meeting of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Milwaukee, August 21, 1912). 
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the law of the English speaking people.”377  Former Secretary of State 
Elihu Root, honorary chairman of the organizing committee, hoped that 
the Institute’s work might become “the prima facie basis on which judicial 
action will rest.”378   
Neither Uniform Laws nor Restatements have produced the national 
legal unity that the founders of the two organizations hoped for.  Even if 
their comparisons to the Constitution and to Justinian are dismissed as 
wishful thinking, the founders surely would be disappointed by the 
results.  In the first century of its existence, the National Conference 
proposed approximately 200 uniform acts.  Only about ten percent of 
these acts were adopted by as many as forty states; more than half were 
adopted by fewer than ten states.379  Since Restatements are not proposed 
for legislative adoption, their adoption necessarily is piecemeal.  In 
practice, they are only sometimes the prima facie basis for judicial 
analysis that Root sought.380   
C. Localism 
American localism raises similar issues as federalism while adding a 
new one of its own:  rank amateurism.  Localities are often very small.  
Their rules may be deficient technically or even bizarre.  Inasmuch as 
there are 3,034 county governments and 35,937 sub-county governments 
                                                 
377 REPORT OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 90 
(1923); William Draper Lewis, The American Law Institute, 25 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 25, 28 
(1943). 
378 Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 
IOWA L. REV. 19, 22 (1929); see also ROGERS, supra note 40, at 184 (explaining that Root was 
president of the American Bar Association from 1915 to 1916); Herbert F. Goodrich, The 
American Law Institute to Date, 8 OR. L. REV. 3, 7 (1928). 
379 James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 2096, 2103-05 (1991). 
380 A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 299 
(2003).  The limited success of their work is demonstrated by the less than complete success 
of their best-received project, the U.C.C.  Notwithstanding adoptions in all states, it has not 
created uniform law.  States have adopted different versions of key provisions; in some 
instances, the U.C.C. even offers alternative provisions.  Id.  Amendments have been 
difficult first to agree upon within the two bodies and then difficult to get approved by 
state legislatures at consistent paces.  Since the U.C.C. is state law, there is no single court 
that can interpret it authoritatively.  Overby notes that people interested in uniform law are 
as likely to turn to the federal government to get uniformity.  Id.  This has proven more 
successful, but creates its own issues of rule reliability, since federal law may not well 
coordinate with the state law.  Id. 
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(municipalities and townships) in the United States, the possibilities for 
perplexing the law-abiding are substantial.381   
While the problems of American localism for lawmaking parallel 
those of the federal-state relationship, their origins are different.  The 
Constitution anticipates that both federal and state governments have 
lawmaking authority.  But unlike some foreign federal constitutions,382 it 
has nothing to say about local governments.  Localities have lawmaking 
authority only by grace of the states.383  Originally, the states universally 
followed what was called “Dillon’s Rule.”  That rule strictly limited 
municipal powers to those powers expressly granted by the legislature, 
necessarily implied from the grant or indispensable to the object and 
purpose of local government.  It resolved all doubts in favor of finding 
that the local government did not have power.384   
Beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century, states began 
extending to localities municipal home rule.  Often, in addition to 
authority to administer their own affairs, states granted authority to 
legislate.  In the twentieth century most states reversed Dillon’s Rule.  
The United States Supreme Court went so far as to conceptualize local 
government as a “miniature State within its locality.”385  Today localism 
is characterized as “the intrastate analogue of federalism in American 
constitutional law.”386  Most states apply a rule that “all powers are 
granted until retracted.”387  This includes authority to issue laws388 as 
                                                 
381 2002 CENSUS OF GOV’TS, GC02-1(P) 5 (2002), available at http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/ 
cog/2002COGprelim_report.pdf.  The same census also reports another 13,522 school 
districts and special district governments (e.g., natural resources, fire protection, water 
supply).  Id. 
382 See, e.g., ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(1986) (discussing, inter alia, that constitution’s guarantee of the right of localities to 
administer their own affairs). 
383 Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 10 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1895). 
384 Id. at 2 (quoting 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS 145 (4th ed. 1890)).  Dillon was president of the American Bar Association 
from 1891-1892.  ROGERS, supra note 40, at 66 (calling Dillon a “lawyers’ lawyer”). 
385 D.C. v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953); see Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part I—The Structure Of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism] (“an imperium in imperio, a state within a state, 
possessed of the full police power with respect to municipal affairs and also enjoying a 
correlative degree of immunity from state legislative interference”); Wayne A. Logan, The 
Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO  ST. L.J. 1409, 1421 (2001). 
386 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627 (2001). 
387 Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 385, at 10; see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.  Under the 
California Constitution a “city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, 
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”  Richard 
Maxeiner: Legal Indeterminancy Made in America:  U.S. Legal Methods and the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
586 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
significant as creating criminal offenses and prohibiting trade 
practices.389  But broad lawmaking power in local governments 
diminishes legal determinacy.  While it might be possible, if difficult, to 
keep track of the laws of fifty-one lawmakers, no one could cost-
effectively follow the laws of 39,022 lawmakers.   
Granting local governments free lawmaking authority was not 
inevitable.  Nineteenth-century jurists, such as Professor Frank 
Goodnow, the “father” of American administrative law, pointed the way 
to an alternative approach based on administrative powers of local 
governments to carry out state laws and to be subject to state 
administrative oversight.  Such an approach would have enhanced rule 
determinacy, not only by denying local governments “local legal 
autonomy,” but also by subjecting their actions to state oversight.390   
States could limit the powers of local governments to administering 
their own affairs and curtail or eliminate altogether legislative authority.  
States could circumscribe with particularity what legislation local 
governments are allowed to adopt, and some do to some extent.  
Additionally, states could automatically review legislation adopted by 
local governments.  Moreover, states could provide local governments 
with model laws and qualified draftsmen.  While other countries with 
strong local governments do such things,391 American states largely do 
not.  Nor have they provided other effective mechanisms to coordinate 
and control the quality of the municipal rules that they have made 
possible.  The principal device they have used is judicial review similar 
to that which federal courts apply to potential conflicts between state 
and federal legislation.  State courts examine whether local legislation is 
consistent with state legislation or if state legislation preempts the 
field.392  That review is subject to the same difficulties that federal review 
has discussed above.  There are few opportunities to test local laws 
before they come into force.   
                                                                                                             
Briffault, Local Government and the New York State Constitution, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 
79, 99 (1996); Logan, supra note 385, at 1421. 
388 Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 385, at 15. 
389 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 385. 
390 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2301-09 (2003). 
Goodnow’s studies of foreign approaches surely must have influenced his proposals); see, 
e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1893) (having much in 
common with the German approach). 
391 See, e.g., GUNLICKS, supra note 382. 
392 Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 385, at 17-18. 
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VII.  CALL FOR COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 
This Article has shown that American indeterminacy results from 
deliberate decisions393 unrelated to inherent weaknesses in legal systems.  
The American legal system abandoned—for good reasons—historic 
ordering mechanisms of binding precedents and pleadings.  It turned to 
statutes and discovery.  But it has yet to develop satisfactory 
mechanisms to make, find, and apply law, and to coordinate these 
functions among differing governments.   
What should be done?  Professor Dorf correctly says that Americans 
should see “legal indeterminacy as a real problem calling for a real 
institutional approach.”394  Indeterminacy is pervasive.  The American 
legal system needs a major overhaul.  Mere tinkering is not enough.   
How to begin?  First, Americans could pay more attention to law as 
legal rules that order society and less to law as a system of judicial 
resolution of disputes.395  Second, they could focus less on judicial 
process as a means for appellate courts to make legal rules and more on 
lower courts as neutral appliers of existing law.  Third, they could 
acknowledge the importance of legal methods and the impact they have 
on legal determinacy.  Fourth, they could strive to make better rules.  In 
short, they could take rules seriously as rules.   
How should this be done?  Professor Dorf urges that Americans 
“reimagine” their legal system.396  How can they do that?  
“Reimagining” a whole system is a daunting and impossible challenge.  
It is beyond any one person’s capabilities.  There are so many details in a 
legal system and so many consequences that cannot be foreseen.  In any 
event, were some jurists to accomplish such a “reimagining,” how would 
they persuade legislatures not to reject their ideas as mere academic 
speculation?  There is a faster, cheaper, and better way than imagination.  
The American law school academy puts great faith in inward-looking 
empirical scholarship.  Now is time to look outward.   
Ever since Solon drafted new laws for Athens, lawmakers have seen 
the benefit of looking at the laws of others.397  Americans could do the 
                                                 
393 Accord UPHAM, supra note 8, at 19. 
394 Dorf, supra note 2, at 981. 
395 But cf. John Dickinson, Legal Rules in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 847 
(1931). 
396 Dorf, supra note 2, at 877. 
397 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign 
Experiences, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 362 (1977). 
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same.  While scholars once downplayed the importance of methods in 
comparative law, today they see that there is much to learn from study 
of foreign legal methods.398  The problems considered in this Article are 
well-suited to comparative investigation.  It is no coincidence that those 
Americans who most clearly saw the developing defects in the American 
system were themselves familiar with foreign legal systems and 
methods.399  Let Americans look to how others have addressed the same 
problems.  Other systems may not have right answers, or their answers 
may not be right for the United States, but their answers can help 
Americans find the answers.  The problems discussed in this Article lend 
themselves to comparative investigation.  For example:   
(1)  Lawmaking through codification is the hallmark 
of the modern civil law.  Systematic legislation is its 
program.  Professional legislation is found in common 
law countries such as England.  Codification and 
systematic legislation are topics of current vitality.  
Within the recent past, the Netherlands and America’s 
next-door neighbor Quebec have adopted new civil 
codes.  The European Union is systematizing legislation 
at a breadth, depth, and speed never before seen.   
(2) Law-finding is facilitated by systematic 
legislation but is not fulfilled thereby alone.  Civil law 
systems recognize the utility of case law today as never 
before.  Case law and code law can work efficiently 
together.   
(3) Syllogistic law application—long the stepchild 
of American law—is central to fulfillment of the 
guidance function of the rule of law.  Subject to criticism 
around the world, it remains at the heart of civil law 
systems.   
                                                 
398 Maxeiner, supra note 23, at 114. 
399 Accord van Santvoord, supra note 100, at 41-42. 
[T]he example of these eminent jurists [Livingston, Story, Legaré] also 
shows you what has been done here in America towards elevating and 
improving our jurisprudence by infusing into it the principles drawn 
from a system which the common law has for so long a time virtually 
repudiated, and which is even today almost a sealed volume to the 
great mass of our legal practitioners. 
Id. 
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(4) Globalization of the world has required more 
federal states and closer cooperation among states than 
ever before.  It has led to demands for increased 
localization.  American federal experiences are no longer 
unique and there is much to learn from foreign 
experiences.   
It’s time to get started.400 
                                                 
400 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
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